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Abstract
Multimedia codestreams distributed through open and insecure networks are sub-
jected to attacks such as malicious content tampering and unauthorized accesses.
This dissertation first addresses the issue of authentication as a mean to integrity-
protect multimedia codestreams against malicious tampering. Two cryptographic-
based authentication schemes are proposed to authenticate generic scalable video
codestreams with a multi-layered structure. The first scheme combines the salient
features of hash-chaining and double error correction coding to achieve loss re-
siliency with low communication overhead and proxy-transparency. The second
scheme further improves computation cost by replacing digital signature with a
hash-based message authentication code to achieve packet-level authentication and
loss-resiliency. Both schemes are robust to transcoding, i.e., they require only one-
time authentication but allow verification on different transcoded versions. A com-
prehensive analysis is performed on the proposed schemes in comparison to existing
work in terms of their authentication and verification delays, communication over-
head, and buffer sizes needed for authentication/verification.
Scalable video codestreams encoded by the H.264/SVC standard are made up
of frames with spatial and quality layers while each frame belongs to a specific
temporal layer. Taking into account the dependency structure of an H.264/SVC
codestream, a secure and efficient cryptographic-based authentication scheme that
is fully compatible with such a structure is proposed. By integrating the tempo-
ral scalability structure with a combination of double error correction coding and
packet replication techniques, the proposed scheme is highly loss-resilient with a
low communication overhead under burst loss condition. Performances of the pro-
posed scheme under different encoding settings are further analyzed and the results
showed that the proposed scheme outperforms an existing scheme in terms of its
loss-resiliency. The proposed scheme also exhibits low authentication and verifi-
cation delays, which is an important performance factor for real-time multimedia
applications.
The third work in this dissertation studies the security of content-based authen-
tication for non-scalable video codestreams. Based upon the video coding concept,
it is shown that existing transform-domain content-based authentication schemes
exhibit a common design flaw, where the transform-domain feature extracted is not
sufficient to represent the true semantic meaning of the codestreams. Consequently,
although the schemes are able to detect semantic-changing attacks performed in
the pixel domain, they are unable to detect attacks performed in the transform do-
main. A comprehensive discussion on how the flaw can be exploited by manip-
ulating transform domain parameters is presented and several attack examples are
demonstrated. In addition, the concept behind attacks that manipulate the transform-
domain header parameters and the conditions of the attacks, given the attacker’s
desired attack content, are discussed in depth.
Finally, the issue of access control as a mean to regulate unauthorized accesses
to protected codestreams is studied. For generic scalable codestreams, a secure and
efficient access control scheme is presented, where symmetric encryption is used
to protect the codestreams, and attribute-based encryption is used to disseminate
access keys to users. We further extend the scheme to address access control for
H.264/SVC codestreams. The proposed schemes are secure against collusion attack
and employ access keys generation hierarchy that is fully compatible to the depen-
dency structures of generic and H.264/SVC codestreams, respectively. As a result,
they are efficient in the way that each user needs to maintain only a single access
key regardless of the number of layers he/she is entitled to access. The proposed
schemes also eliminate the use of an online key distribution center by employing
attribute-based encryption for access keys dissemination.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Multimedia formats such as images and videos are commonly used as the main
visual media in many online applications such as news portals as well as digital
advertising, where in the latter they are regarded as the most important elements that
can effectively convey an intended brand story [12]. Apart from that, images and
videos obtained from surveillance feeds or from a vehicle’s dashboard camera can
also be used as evidences in court in case of disputes. In the telemedicine industry,
patient’s medical images (such as X-rays) are stored in an online medical system so
that personnels across different departments/hospitals can perform timely diagnosis
at anytime and anywhere, whereas videos are also being rapidly adopted to provide
live consultations for patients living in rural areas [1]. Images and videos are also
the most prominently shared multimedia formats in many social media platforms as
they are able to generate a high level of interactions among users [20]. Without a
doubt, online multimedia applications are slowly revolutionizing the way businesses
and day-to-day livings are conducted.
In retrospect, the proliferation of online multimedia applications also raises sev-
eral security issues. One of the main security concerns is the authenticity of multi-
media codestreams. Authentication addresses two main questions: who the sender
is, and whether the multimedia codestream has been maliciously tampered while in
transit. Being able to answer these questions is important because malicious tam-
1
pering on multimedia codestreams could be motivated by numerous commercial or
political purposes, or with the intention to evade law (e.g., attacks on surveillance
codestreams). Recently, a case where a police vehicle dashboard video showing
arrest of a woman allegedly assaulted the police officer is suspected to be edited
before it was released [38]. An incident where a video of the Greek Finance Min-
ister making a rude gesture while addressing relationship between Greece and Ger-
many has created diplomatic controversy; till now, there are no solid evidences on
whether the video has been doctored [6]. Such incidents would not only result in
social and political unrests, it could also hamper the future adoption of many useful
online multimedia applications. It is thus imperative that an appropriate authenti-
cation mechanism is in place to thwart malicious tampering on online multimedia
codestreams.
Another threat is unauthorized content access. Access control involves autho-
rizing legitimate users with appropriate privileges to access a certain resource while
denying access from illegal users. In many commercial multimedia applications
such as video-on-demand, providers may publish free preview of a movie in low
resolution and offer packages of different privilege levels for users who are inter-
ested to purchase the movie in higher resolutions/frame rates. Different users may
then subscribe to different privilege levels, each granting access right to different
codestream qualities. In such setting, a dishonest user may attempt to access unau-
thorized codestream content of quality beyond his or her access rights. For the
provider, it is hence vital to ensure that only legitimate users have access to the
multimedia codestreams, and that each authorized user can only access codestream
content of quality corresponding to the privilege level he or she subscribes to. Fur-
thermore, two or more users subscribing to different privilege levels must not be
able to collude to obtain access rights to a higher privilege level. To achieve this, a
collusion-free access control scheme must be in place to deny accesses from illegal
users while authorizing legitimate users with appropriate privilege levels to access
the corresponding resources.
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The main focuses of this dissertation are on the issues of authentication and ac-
cess control for video codestreams. Compared to images, videos are finding their
ways into much wider practical applications. For example, in the digital advertis-
ing industry, online video has the highest click-through rate compared to all other
digital advertising format [33] and video is about to emerge as the main marketing
method for businesses around the world [26]. Home networked video surveillance
is also expected to increase from 29% in 2014 to 49% by 2016 [83] whereas 71% of
overall retailers are set to adopt networked video surveillance as a part of their loss
prevention strategy [67]. In the telehealth industry, live video used for consultation
or to convey medical records has become the most frequently covered insurance ser-
vice in the United States [1]. It is predicted that by the year 2019, million minutes
of video content is to cross the network in every second [11]. On the other hand, the
concepts and performance requirements for the authentication and access control
schemes proposed in this dissertation is also applicable to the protection of image
codestreams such as those encoded by the JPEG and JPEG2000 standards. More
specifically, cryptographic-based approaches in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 works by identi-
fying the dependency structure in a scalable codestream and designing efficient and
proxy-transparent security schemes that preserve the codestream dependency struc-
ture. The content-based authentication approach in Chapter 5 presents an important
concept, which is the identification of a “feature” that can fully characterize the
interdependent relationship between the transform-domain coefficients and header
parameters of a multimedia codestream in order to thwart any attempt to manipu-
late the multimedia content. Since a video is essentially a sequence of still images
with an additional temporal domain, the methods and concepts proposed in this
dissertation can serve as references for the authentication/access control for other
multimedia formats such as images.
3
1.1 Problem Formulation
It is nonetheless a challenging problem to realize authentication and access con-
trol in an online multimedia distribution framework. Online multimedia applica-
tions prioritize quality of service but security introduces additional computation
and communication overhead on top of those required by the multimedia applica-
tions. Hence, a security scheme designed for multimedia codestreams has to be as
lightweight - in terms of computation costs and communication overhead - as possi-
ble. In addition, it should take up a small amount of buffer size to support real-time
applications, especially on mobile devices.
Multimedia codestreams distributed through the network are also subjected to
packet loss due to transmission errors and network congestion. For this reason, var-
ious error concealment techniques are incorporated in multimedia coding standards
in order to optimize viewing experience in the event of loss. In retrospect, crypto-
graphic algorithms are extremely sensitive to packet loss. To avoid compromising
viewing experience due to a high percentage of received but unverifiable packets, it
is imperative that the security scheme is also loss-resilient. A common solution is to
add redundancies on the security data using error correction code, but the amount of
redundancies incurs additional communication overhead. Care must then be taken
to integrate error correction coding techniques with cryptographic algorithms to
minimize the communication overhead needed to cater for packet loss.
In a multimedia distribution framework, a multimedia codestream can be en-
coded and distributed as either a non-scalable or a scalable codestream. A non-
scalable codestream such as one produced by the H.264/AVC (Advanced Video
Coding) [91] standard is optimally encoded at a pre-specified bit-rate and consists
of intra- and inter-predicted frames, where intra-predicted frame is encoded using
information in the frame itself and thus is more essential for optimal multimedia
representation compared to inter-predicted frames. On the other hand, a scalable
codestream such as one encoded using the H.264/SVC (Scalable Video Coding)
4
[75] standard is a multi-layered codestream consisting of a (mandatory) base layer
that decodes to a coarse multimedia representation, and one or more enhancement
layers, each improving the decoded base layer in terms of either frame rate, reso-
lution or SNR (Signal-to-Noise Ratio). These internal dependency structures of a
codestream should be taken into consideration while designing the security scheme
so as not to compromise users’ viewing experience.
Another concern in online distribution of multimedia codestreams is the prob-
lem of transferring multimedia data as a continuous codestream so that a device can
start playback before receiving the codestream in full. This effort is made more
challenging when receiving devices are heterogeneous in terms of computation ca-
pabilities and bandwidths of the network they are connected to. To address this, bit-
rate transcoding operation adapts a codestream to a bit-rate optimum for a receiving
device and the type of network it is connected to. Different transcoding techniques
are applied depending on the type of codestream. As a non-scalable codestream is
encoded at a pre-specified bit-rate, transcoding technique involves re-encoding the
codestream using a new quantization step size. In retrospect, a scalable codestream
is transcoded by discarding a subset of enhancement layers until the codestream bit-
rate is optimum for the receiving device. However, since a transcoded codestream
is different from the original codestream, security data computed on the original
codestream would be invalidated. Hence, the security scheme should be designed
such that it is robust to transcoding while is able to distinguish between transcoding
(i.e., legitimate changes) and malicious tampering.
To liberate the multimedia source from the heavy workload of catering to a large
population of heterogeneous users, transcoding operation is commonly performed
by one or more intermediate proxies. Each proxy may simultaneously serve a large
user population within a specific geographical area. It is thus highly desirable that
the security scheme is proxy-transparent such that a proxy needs not be aware of
the underlying security mechanism during transcoding; this can effectively relieve
the proxies from additional operational overhead.
5
1.2 Online Multimedia Distribution Framework
The online multimedia distribution framework considered in this dissertation con-
sists of a multimedia source, a set of proxies and a group of heterogeneous end
users. The source produces a protected (scalable/non-scalable) multimedia code-
stream and forwards it to the proxies. The proxies are responsible for transcoding
according to users’ preferences and/or network conditions, and for delivering the
transcoded codestream to the end users. When a user receives a transcoded code-
stream, the user performs decryption and/or authenticity verification on the received
content. The proxy-user network may subject to packet loss due to transmission er-
rors or traffic congestions.
1.3 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation studies the issues of authentication as well as access control in
online distribution of video codestreams. The codestreams are distributed over a
source-proxy-user network as described in Section 1.2 and they can be encoded in
either scalable or non-scalable forms. Taking into account the respective transcod-
ing techniques, this dissertation studies and proposes secure and efficient authen-
tication/access control schemes that are lightweight with low buffer requirement,
high resiliency to loss, robust to transcoding and proxy-transparent.
1.3.1 Authentication for Multimedia Codestreams
The two general approaches for multimedia codestream authentication are
cryptographic-based authentication and content-based authentication [89].
Cryptographic-based authentication schemes make use of cryptographic techniques
such as hash function and digital signature algorithm to compute authentication
data on a multimedia codestream. To verify its authenticity, a user recomputes
the hash of the multimedia codestream and verifies it against the digital signature.
6
The main advantages of cryptographic-based authentication are that the security of
cryptographic algorithms are well-established and it can provide strict verification
without ambiguity.
Cryptographic-based solutions for authenticating non-scalable multimedia
codestreams without considering the event of transcoding is a well-studied prob-
lem (e.g., the works of [28] and [31]). However, a transcoded non-scalable code-
stream cannot be correctly verified using authentication data which is computed on
the original codestream. A naive solution is to pre-encode a codestream into multi-
ple copies of different bit-rates and compute the authentication data for each copy.
However, this is not only storage and computationally intensive, it is also not scal-
able. Another solution is for the source to delegate power to proxies (using crypto-
graphic techniques such as sanitizable signature [5]) so that they can compute valid
authentication data for transcoded codestreams (e.g., the work of [16]). However,
this solution is not proxy-transparent and the verification of sanitizable signature
is computationally intensive for low power devices. There are also security risks
as semi-trusted proxies are given the authorization to “generate” an authenticated
codestream on the source’s behalf.
On the other hand, a content-based authentication scheme works by extracting
a feature that represents the semantic meaning of the multimedia codestream, and
computes authentication data on the feature. For verification, a feature is extracted
from the received codestream and is verified against the authentication data. For
this reason, the problem of authenticating non-scalable codestreams in the event of
transcoding can be more efficiently addressed using content-based authentication
solution since a legitimate transcoding will not alter the codestream semantic.
Scalable multimedia codestreams are encoded into a multi-layered structure
consisting of a mandatory base layer and one or more enhancement layers, each
“enhancing” the base layer content in terms of its frame rate, resolution or SNR. In-
stead of encoding multiple versions of the same content to cater for different devices
or network conditions, a source prepares a single scalable codestream per content
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over a source-proxy-user network, where one or more proxies perform transcod-
ing by removing one or more enhancement layers, before delivering the transcoded
codestreams to end users. In this case, a carefully designed cryptographic-based
authentication scheme that is compatible to the scalable codestream structure be-
fore and after transcoding is a more efficient approach. Compared to content-based
authentication scheme which requires additional feature and watermark extraction
phases, a cryptographic-based authentication scheme can be performed directly at
the codestream level.
The contributions of this dissertation on the issue of online video codestream
authentication are as follows:
 Two novel cryptographic-based authentication schemes for generic scalable
codestreams modeled as a sequence of video frames, and each frame is en-
coded with a spatial-quality base layer and one or more spatial-quality en-
hancement layers are presented. The first scheme combines the advantageous
features of hash-chaining and erasure-correction coding, resulting in an au-
thentication scheme that is proxy-transparent and resilient to packet loss with
low communication overhead. The second scheme further shortens the veri-
fication delay incurred at the users by using hash-based message authentica-
tion code, instead of digital signature, to protect the authenticity of individual
packet. Compared to existing work, the proposed schemes simultaneously
achieve lower computation costs and proxy transparency. A comprehensive
analysis of both schemes in terms of their computation costs, communication
overhead, buffer size requirement and loss-resiliency is also presented.
 The work for generic scalable codestreams is then extended to address the au-
thentication for H.264/SVC codestreams, where in addition to spatial-quality
layers, an H.264/SVC codestream is also encoded with a temporal base layer
and one or more temporal enhancement layers. The proposed cryptographic-
based authentication scheme is H.264/SVC format compliant, capable of sup-
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porting all three scalabilities provided by H.264/SVC, robust to transcoding
and proxy-transparent, and it incurs minimal buffer requirements at both the
source and the users. The scheme is implemented on a smart phone and ex-
periment result shows that the computation cost of the scheme is acceptable
for low-power devices. To realistically assess packet loss-resiliency of the
scheme, a Gilbert model which closely characterizes packet loss behavior in
wireless mobile networks is employed and simulation results demonstrate that
the scheme is able to achieve high verification rates (i.e., good loss-resiliency)
at much lower communication overhead compared to existing schemes.
 The security of existing transform-domain content-based authentication
schemes as a mean to authenticate non-scalable codestreams is studied. Ex-
isting transform-domain content-based authentication schemes are surveyed
and sorted into two categories, and a common design flaw in these schemes is
identified - i.e., the transform-domain feature extracted and authenticated in
these schemes is insufficient to securely authenticate a codestream. As a re-
sult, although both categories of schemes are able to detect semantic-changing
attacks performed in the pixel domain, they are unable to detect attacks per-
formed in the transform domain. The ways that transform domain parame-
ters in an authenticated codestream can be manipulated to mount semantic-
changing attacks are described and several attack examples are presented. Fi-
nally, an analysis on the attacks that manipulate the transform-domain header
parameters of a codestream, and the conditions of the attack given the at-
tacker’s desired attack content, is presented.
1.3.2 Access Control for Multimedia Streams
Solutions for access control fall into two categories: access control models and
cryptographic-based techniques. For better scalability purpose, multimedia code-
streams are commonly being stored at the proxies in a distributed fashion. For
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this reason, it becomes more important to store the codestreams in encrypted form
and employ cryptographic-based access control to manage accesses to protected
codestreams. A cryptographic-based access control manages authorization by en-
crypting the codestreams such that only authorized users with the right access keys
can decrypt the codestreams. This often involves the deployment of an online Key
Distribution Center (KDC) to distribute access keys to authorized users.
One of the aims of this work is to design a cryptographic-based access control
scheme that eliminates the usage of online KDC. An online KDC poses a scalabil-
ity problem as the number of users increases and its improper management could
result in a single point of failure. Secondly, the access control scheme should also
be secure against collusion attacks, where two or more users subscribing to differ-
ent (lower) privilege levels must not be able to collude and derive the access keys
for codestreams at higher privilege levels. As multimedia codestreams are rich in
internal structure, an access control scheme should employ an efficient access keys
generation hierarchy that is fully compatible with the structure of the codestream
and is efficient such that the source and user needs to only receive a minimal num-
ber of access keys in order to decrypt the codestream.
The contribution of this dissertation on the issue of access control for scalable
multimedia codestreams is as follow:
 Two cryptographic-based access control schemes for generic and H.264/SVC
codestreams, respectively, are presented. Building on top of an authentication
scheme, the schemes use symmetric encryption to encrypt the codestreams
and employ attribute-based encryption to disseminate access keys to autho-
rized users. The proposed schemes employ secure and efficient key genera-
tion hierarchy that is fully compatible with the structure of the respectively
codestreams. Compared to existing work, the schemes are secure against col-
lusion attacks and are efficient in the sense that users need to only maintain a
single access key regardless of their privilege levels.
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1.3.3 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follow. Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive lit-
erature review on existing authentication schemes for scalable and non-scalable
codestreams, as well as existing work on access control for scalable codestreams.
Chapter 3 studies cryptographic-based authentication method for generic scalable
codestreams and Chapter 4 extends the work to address cryptographic-based au-
thentication for H.264/SVC codestreams. The security of existing content-based
authentication schemes is studied in depth in Chapter 5 while the issue of access
control is studied in Chapter 6. Finally, the dissertation conclusion and possible
future work is summarized in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Cryptographic-Based Authentication for Multi-
media Codestreams
Most of the existing cryptographic-based solutions for multimedia authentication
are designed for non-scalable codestreams. A non-scalable codestream can be mod-
eled as a sequence of packets. In the work of [28], the proposed scheme computes
the hash of a packet, attaches the hash to its previous/next packet and the last packet
in the hash chain is digitally signed. This method has a low communication over-
head and computation cost but it is not resilient to packet loss; in other words, the
loss of a single packet causes the hash chain to break and results in authentication
failure. Subsequent works such as those in [29] [31] [54] [64] [79] [94] [103] [101]
focus on devising different hash graph-based authentication method coupled with
digital signature to achieve loss resiliency. In these schemes, each packet carries
at least two hashes. As a result, communication overhead is a trade-off with loss-
resiliency and is generally at a multiple of hashes.
Instead of embedding multiple hashes within a packet as the schemes above, the
work of [61] presents the use of error correction coding as an alternative to improve
loss-resiliency. In this scheme, a codestream is divided into groups of n packets, and
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the hash of each packet is computed to obtain n hashes. Then, the scheme computes
a digital signature on the concatenation of the hashes, and performs error correction
coding on the concatenation of these hashes and the signature; the resulting codes
are then dispersed to the n packets. During verification, as long as the number of
packets received is at a threshold value, the hashes and the signature can be recov-
ered to authenticate the received packets. An improvement to the work of [61] is
given in [60], where the scheme in [60] further lowers the communication over-
head by performing error correction coding twice on the hashes and signature. A
complete and excellent survey on authentication for non-scalable multimedia code-
streams can be found in [32].
For cryptographic-based authentication of scalable codestreams, the main idea
is to identify the scalability structure of a codestream. In [96], three authentica-
tion schemes are designed for MPEG-4 codestreams; two of which - the Flat Au-
thentication Scheme (FAS) and the Progressive Authentication Scheme (PAS) - use
exclusive-OR and concatenation techniques respectively to generate the hash of a
frame, where a frame consists of a base layer and one or more enhancement lay-
ers. It is worth noting that while these schemes are designed for MPEG-4 code-
streams, they can also be applied to generic scalable codestreams. However, these
schemes are not proxy-transparent, and they support only spatial-quality scalability
(i.e., transcoding is performed by discarding spatial-quality layers within a frame)
without considering temporal scalability. In [32], a hash-chaining technique is used
for generating hashes for frames in a generic scalable multimedia codestreams. Sim-
ilarly, it models a scalable codestream as a sequence of packets/frames and each
frame has a base layer and multiple enhancement layers. Each enhancement layer
of a frame is hashed and its hash is attached to its predecessor layer in the same
frame. Then, the hash of each frame (i.e. the hash of the base layer) is appended to
its previous frame, and the first frame of the group is digitally signed. This scheme
is proxy-transparent but it is not loss-resilient and it also does not support tempo-
ral scalability. More recently, an authentication scheme for H.264/SVC-encoded
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codestreams is presented in [56]. The scheme supports all scalabilities provided
by H.264/SVC streams where temporal layers are authenticated using a hash chain.
The scheme is proxy-transparent, but it has a high communication overhead.
2.2 Content-Based Authentication for Multimedia
Codestreams
Content-based authentication is concerned with extracting a feature that is robust
to transcoding and can truly represent the semantic meaning of the multimedia
codestream. In this section, a survey is performed on existing transform-domain
content-based authentication schemes, where the feature is extracted from either the
transform-domain header parameters or payload (i.e., coefficients) of macroblocks
(a 1616-pixel area) in a frame.
In [18], [44], [74] and [88], a feature is extracted by computing a hash on dif-
ferent macroblock coefficients, which makes the schemes not robust to transcoding.
In [45], [76] and [100], a feature is extracted by computing a hash of both the coef-
ficients and a header parameter called the “motion vectors”; similarly, the schemes
are also not robust to transcoding. The work of [81] extracts a feature that is ro-
bust to transcoding from the DC coefficient of macroblocks in a frame whereas the
work of [102] utilizes the stable relationship between DC coefficients of two adja-
cent macroblocks as a robust feature. On the other hand, the work of [14] extracts
a robust feature by extracting partial energy difference between coefficients of two
macroblocks.
The authentication data (i.e., watermark) computed from the feature is either
embedded back into the coefficients in the payload (i.e., coefficients), or into the
header (i.e., prediction parameters). For embedding into payload, the rule of evalu-
ating Least Significant Bit (LSB) [18][81][100], zero/non-zero coefficients [102] or
energy relationship between coefficients [14][88] are used, whereas for embedding
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into header, the rule of evaluating LSB [44][74] of motion vectors is used.
To disallow transcoding on codestreams such as those in the surveillance appli-
cations (which would lose vital details if transcoded), the work of [35] proposes to
extract a feature from the header, e.g., the “directional prediction modes” of mac-
roblocks in a frame. In [63], both the directional prediction modes and macroblock
partition sizes are used as feature for authentication. These schemes are shown to
reliably detect semantic-changing attacks as well as unauthorized transcoding due
to the fragile nature of header parameters. The watermark is then embedded into
the payload using the LSB evaluation rule.
The three most common security problems in content-based authentication
schemes for images, namely undetected modifications, information leakage and
protocol weakness, are summarized in [25]. For example, in [34], the authors point
out that due to independent pixel-/block-wise feature and watermark extraction, the
schemes in [95] and [99] are vulnerable to collage attacks, where an attacker can
swap pixels or blocks within an image (or among database of images authenticated
using the same secret key) to produce a counterfeit image. To thwart this attack,
[48] proposes to extract feature from one block and embed its watermark into an-
other randomly selected block. However, due to information leakage in watermark
generation, the secret block relationship graph can be exposed by an attacker as
shown in [10]. A similar flaw in [46][47] has also been exploited by [97] to expose
the secret relationship graph via a verification device attack [25]. While there are
many studies on security of content-based authentication schemes for images, not
many have been done for videos, except for the work of [86], where a flaw in wa-
termark generation process in [74] is identified. As will be discussed and shown in
Chapter 5, almost all prediction parameters in the header have interdependent rela-
tionship with the payload. If such relationship cannot be fully characterized by the
feature, it can be exploited to achieve undetected semantic-changing attacks.
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2.3 Access Control for Multimedia Codestreams
Access control schemes for codestreams encoded by the MPEG-4 Fine Granularity
Scalability (FGS) standard are proposed in [105] and [106]. In these work, it is
assumed that a single encrypted MPEG-4 FGS codestream is used to cater for two
different applications - one requiring scalability in terms of PSNR (peak signal-to-
noise ratio) and another in terms of bit-rate. To this end, video data of an MPEG-4
FGS quality enhancement layer frame is partitioned into a group of segments. Each
segment simultaneously belongs to a PSNR layer and a bit-rate layer that are corre-
lated to each other, e.g., a low PSNR layer is likely to share data with a low (instead
of a high) bit-rate layer. The security requirement in [105] and [106] is to ensure that
a right to access a layer of one scalability type does not make the layers of the other
scalability type also accessible, or vice versa. In [106], independent access keys are
generated for encrypting each segment. This scheme is inefficient primarily due to
the large number of access keys to be managed by the users. In [105], the authors
exploited one-way hash function and property of the Diffie-Hellman problem to re-
duce the number of access keys to be managed by the users. However, the scheme is
vulnerable to collusion attack and it also requires an online key distribution center
(KDC) to distribute access keys to users.
In [93], an access control scheme for H.264/SVC-encoded codestreams is pro-
posed. It treats an H.264/SVC codestream as a two dimensional structure - the
spatial-quality scalability dimension and the temporal scalability dimension where
the former models the spatial-quality layers of each frame and the latter models a
subset of frames. Using the term “unit” to denote a portion of video data for a par-
ticular temporal and spatial-quality layer, the work of [93] encrypts each unit using
an access key generated in a hierarchical manner. However, the scheme is also vul-
nerable to collusion attack and assumes the presence of an online KDC for access
keys distribution.
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Chapter 3
Cryptographic-based Authentication
for Generic Scalable Codestreams
3.1 Introduction
Most of the existing cryptographic-based authentication schemes (e.g., [28], [31]
and [103]) are designed for non-scalable codestreams (such as those encoded by the
H.222jMPEG-2 [37] standard), where the entire codestream must be available for
successful decoding. Therefore, these authentication schemes are monolithic and
cannot be directly applied to scalable codestreams, because a legitimate transcoding
will be viewed as tampering and the codestreams would be rejected.
A scalable multimedia codestream is encoded into a multi-layered structure.
The base layer is mandatory for successful decoding and it decodes to a coarse
multimedia representation. To improve the multimedia representation in terms of
either frame rate, resolution or PSNR (peak signal-to-noise ratio), a decoder must
further decode one or more enhancement layers in the respective scalability dimen-
sion. During transcoding, the proxy discards, starting from the highest layer, one
or more enhancement layers to reduce the codestream bit-rate. Thus, apart from
satisfying the security requirement, an authentication scheme designed for scal-
able codestreams must preserve such scalability structure in order to be robust to
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transcoding.
There are only a few authentication schemes proposed for scalable multime-
dia codestreams. In [16], an authentication scheme for generic data modality is
proposed, where sanitizable signature [5] is used to allow intermediate proxies to
modify certain portion of the data without invalidating its authentication data. The
scheme is then extended to address the authentication of JPEG-2000 and MPEG-
4 scalable codestreams. However, due to the use of sanitizable signature, the
scheme has high computation costs for the source and users, and they are not
proxy-transparent. In [96], the Flat Authentication Scheme (FAS) and the Pro-
gressive Authentication Scheme (PAS) proposed for MPEG-4 video codestreams
use exclusive-OR and concatenation technique, respectively, to generate the hash
for a frame containing one or more layers. However, these schemes are not proxy-
transparent as the proxies are required to insert auxiliary authentication information
into the transcoded codestream for a successful authentication. Note that while the
schemes in [96] are designed with MPEG-4 codestreams in mind, they can also be
applied to authenticate generic scalable codestreams.
In the work of [32], a hash-chaining technique for authenticating generic scal-
able multimedia codestreams is proposed. It models a scalable codestream as a
sequence of frames, where each frame has a base layer and multiple enhancement
layers. The codestream is divided and processed in groups of n frames. Each en-
hancement layer of a frame is hashed and its hash is attached to its predecessor
layer in the same frame. Then, the hash of each frame (i.e. the hash computed on
the base layer) is appended to its previous frame, and the first frame of the group
is digitally signed. Due to the one-way property of the hash function, the signature
authenticates the entire group of frames. Note that a transcoded codestream with a
base layer and zero or more enhancement layers can be verified using the authenti-
cation data carried only in that transcoded codestream. This property implies that
the scheme is proxy-transparent, i.e. to transcode a multimedia codestream, a proxy
simply discards certain number of enhancement layers from the top and delivers the
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remaining layers to users. However, the scheme does not tolerate frame loss - once
a frame is lost, all subsequent frames in a group become non-verifiable and must be
rejected. The same authors also proposed an authentication scheme for H.264/SVC
codestreams [56]. The scheme supports all scalabilities provided by H.264/SVC but
it has a high communication overhead.
In this chapter, two schemes for authenticating generic scalable multimedia
codestreams over packet-lossy source-proxy-user networks are presented. As in
[32] and [96], a generic scalable multimedia codestream is modeled as a sequence
of frames, where each frame contains a base layer and m (m  0) cumulative en-
hancement layers as shown in Figure 3.1. During transcoding, the proxy discards a
subset of enhancement layers, starting from the highest layer. Without loss of gen-
erality, it is assumed that each network packet carries a complete frame; in the rest
of this chapter, the terms “frame” and “packet” will be used interchangeably. The
first scheme combines the advantageous features of [32] and [96], resulting in an
authentication scheme which is proxy-transparent and resilient to packet loss with
a low communication overhead. The second scheme further improves the computa-
tion cost incurred at the end user side by using Hash-based Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), instead of digital signature, to protect the integrity of individual
packet. Both schemes are analyzed in detail in terms of their computation costs,
communication overhead, buffer size requirements, and loss-resiliency in compari-
son to the schemes in [32] and [96].
3.1.1 Erasure Correction Code
Let k and n be two positive integers satisfying k < n. An (n; k) ECC consists
of an encoder module and a decoder module. The encoder module accepts a k-
tuple of information symbols Xk = (x1; x2;    ; xk) and outputs an n-tuple of
codeword Yn = (y1; y2;    ; yn) where all xi and yj have the same bit length,
1  i  k and 1  j  n. In an (n; k) systematic ECC, the codeword
19
EL3
EL2
EL1
BL
Frame i
S
p
a
ti
a
l-
q
u
a
li
ty
 s
ca
la
b
il
it
y
Figure 3.1: Structure of a generic scalable codestream, where each frame has an SQ
(spatial-quality) base layer and m = 3 SQ enhancement layers. Each SQ enhance-
ment layer cumulatively improves the base layer in terms of resolution or PSNR.
Yn = (x1; x2;    ; xk; yk+1; yk+2;    ; yn), where yk+1;    ; yn, are called parity
check symbols [49]. Assuming that the (n; k) ECC is maximum distance separable,
i.e., its minimum Hamming distance is n   k + 1, given any k or more symbols in
Yn, the decoder can output the original information of Xk [49].
The first authentication scheme makes use of a double-ECC coding scheme
(DECS), which is similar to that used in [60], to achieve a high probability of
successful authentication but with low communication overhead. A DECS scheme
consists of an (n; k) systematic ECC scheme and a (2n   k; n) systematic ECC
scheme, denoted by ECCn;k and ECC2n k;n respectively. The encoding and de-
coding functions of the DECS scheme are described below.
Encoding function DECS-EN(Xn) This function takes as input an n-tuple
Xn = (x1; x2;    ; xn) where xi is l bits long, and outputs Zn =
(x1ky1; x2ky2;    ; xnkyn), where “k” denotes the concatenation of two sym-
bols. The function proceeds in four steps:
1. Compute a 2n   k-tuple (x1; x2;    ; xn; c1; c2;    ; cn k)  
ECC2n k;n(Xn).
2. Divide c1kc2k    kcn k into k symbols of equal length, denoted by
(d1; d2    ; dk).
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3. Compute an n-tuple (y1; y2;    ; yn) ECCn;k(d1; d2;    ; dk).
4. OutputWn = (x1ky1; x2ky2;    ; xnkyn).
Decoding function DECS-DE(Yq) Suppose Yq = (xi1kyi1 ; xi2kyi2 ;    ; xiqkyiq)
is a subset of Wn and k  q  n. The decoding function takes Yq as in-
put and outputs Xn with the following steps:
1. Use ECCn;k to decode (yi1 ; yi2 ;    ; yiq) to obtain (d1; d2;    ; dk),
since q  k.
2. Divide d1kd2k    kdk into n   k symbols of equal length, namely
(c1; c2;    ; cn k).
3. Use ECC2n k;n to decode (xi1 ; xi2 ;    ; xiq) and (c1; c2;    ; cn k) to
get Xn = (x1; x2;    ; xn) since q + n  k  n.
The remarkable benefit of DECS is that, as long as at least k symbols inWn are
received, the DECS decoding ensures that all (x1; x2;    ; xn) will be recovered.
3.1.2 List of Notations
The list of notations used throughout this chapter is listed in Table 3.1.
Notation Description
H(:) One-way hash function, e.g., SHA-1 [23]
n Number of packets/frames in one Group-of-Frames (GOF)
m Number of enhancement layers in a frame
t Number of enhancement layers removed by proxy in transcoding
Gid, Sid GOF and codestream identifier, respectively
q Number of authenticated packets received by the user
k Parameter for erasure correction code (ECC)
yi, si ECC codewords for packet hashes and digital signature, respectively
Table 3.1: List of notations
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3.2 Signature-based Authentication Scheme
The proposed signature-based authentication scheme consists of three algorithms:
the Authentication algorithm used by a source to generate and insert authentication
data; the Transcoding algorithm used by a proxy to perform transcoding and the
Verification algorithm used by an end user to verify the authenticity of received
packets.
A multimedia codestream is divided into groups of n packets. Because packet
groups are processed independently, the following descriptions focus on the pro-
cessing of one packet group G = [P1; P2;    ; Pn], where Pi denotes the i-th
packet (or frame) in the group. For each packet Pi, let Li;0 denote its base
layer and Li;j denote its j-th enhancement layer, j = 1; 2;    ;m. Therefore,
Pi = Li;0kLi;1k    ; kLi;jk    kLi;m.
During system initialization, the source chooses a digital signature scheme  =
(Sig();Vfy()) with a secret key sk and a public key pk. The source’s signature on
a message M is computed as  = Sigsk(M). Given signature  and message M ,
anyone can verify the authenticity ofM by checking whether Vfypk(;M) returns 1.
The source’s public key pk is distributed to all users in the system in an authenticated
manner. The proposed scheme consists of the following three algorithms.
Authentication algorithm: Suppose that the source generates a multime-
dia codestream with an identifier Sid. Taking as input a packet group G =
[P1; P2;    ; Pn] with an identifier Gid, the source performs the following steps to
output an authenticated packet group G0.
Step A1. For each packet Pi, 1  i  n, compute hi;m = H(Li;mkm) as the hash
of the top enhancement layer, and compute hi;j = H(hi;j+1kLi;jkj), for layer
Li;j , 0  j  m  1.
Step A2. Generate the codeword (h1;0ky1;    ; hn;0kyn) =
DECS-EN(h1;0; h2;0;    ; hn;0).
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Figure 3.2: Packet hashes generation for the proposed Signature-based authentica-
tion scheme. Dotted arrow represents calculation of hash value, solid arrow indi-
cates the action of appending.
Step A3. Compute the packet group hash H =
H(h1;0kh2;0k    khn;0kpkkGidkSid) and  = Sigsk(H).
Step A4. Divide the binary string of  into k equal-length segments
(1; 2;    ; k). Generate the codeword (s1; s2;    ; sn) by applying
the ECCn;k encoding function on (1; 2;    ; k).
Step A5. Output G0 = [P 01; P 02;    ; P 0n] as the authenticated packet group where
P 01;    ; P 0n are given by
L0i;m = Li;m (3.1)
L0i;j = hi;j+1kLi;j; for 1  j  m  1 (3.2)
L0i;0 = hi;1kLi;0kyiksi (3.3)
P 0i = L
0
i;0kL0i;1k    kL0i;m (3.4)
Figure 3.2 depicts the procedure for the source to generate packet hashes. In the
end, the source transmits G0 to the proxies.
Transcoding algorithm: Upon receivingG0 = [P 01;    ; P 0n] from the source, the
proxy transcodes it according to the downstream network bandwidth or capabilities
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of user devices by removing a number of enhancement layers from the top. To
remove the top t enhancement layers, 1  t  m, the proxy simply truncates every
packet P 0i in G
0 into a new packet P 00i such that P
00
i = L
0
i;0k    kL0i;m t. Then, the
proxy forwards G00 = [P 001 ;    ; P 00n ] to end users.
Verification algorithm: Due to packet loss, a user may only receive q of the n
packets in G00 sent by the proxy, k  q  n, denoted as G^ = [P 00i1 ;    ; P 00iq ], where
1  i1 < i2 <    < iq  n. If q < k, the user rejects G^ because it does not contain
sufficient information for verification. Otherwise, the user runs the following steps
to verify the integrity.
Step V1. For each packet P 00j 2 G^, parse P 00j into m   t + 1 layers, i.e.
P 00j = Lj;0kLj;1k    kLj;m t. In addition, parse the base layer Lj;0 such
that Lj;0 = h^j;1kL^j;0kyjksj and parse each enhancement layer Lj;l such
that Lj;l = h^j;l+1kL^j;l for l 2 [1;m   t]. Namely, the user recovers
(fL^j;lgm tl=0 ; fh^j;lgm tl=0 ; yj; sj) for each packet P 00j .
Step V2. For each packet P 00j 2 G^, compute the hash values from the (m   t)-
th enhancement layer down to the base layer. Namely, compute hj;l =
H(hj;l+1kL^j;lkl), 0  l  m  t  1 and hj;m t = h^j;m t.
Step V3. For all packets P 00j 2 G^, use the hashes on their base layers and the
y values to recover the hash of the packet group G^. Namely, compute
(h1;0; h2;0;    ; hn;0) = DECS-DE(hi1;0kyi1 ; hi2;0kyi2 ;    ; hiq ;0kyiq), since
q  k.
Step V4. Compute the packet group hash H =
H(h1;0kh2;0k    khn;0kpkkGidkSid).
Step V5. Recover the signature by computing (1; 2;    ; k) =
DECS-DE(si1 ; si2 ;    ; siq), since q  k. Set  = 1k2k    kk.
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Step V6. Verify the signature by checking whether Vfypk(;H) outputs 1. If so,
accept G^; otherwise reject it.
3.3 HMAC-based Authentication Scheme
It is demanding for a low-power device in the Signature-based authentication
scheme to store a group of n packets and verify the digital signature without dis-
rupting the codestream data rendition. In this section, a lightweight authentication
scheme employing HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) is presented.
Since the computation time of a HMAC is comparable to that of a hash computation,
the scheme significantly reduces the computation cost of the end users. A prerequi-
site of this scheme is that the source shares a secret key kMAC with all users. The
key management issue will be discussed in the next section.
The HMAC-based scheme also consists of an Authentication algorithm for the
source, a Transcoding algorithm for the proxies and a Verification algorithm for end
users. The Transcoding algorithm is identical to that in the Signature-based scheme
and hence is omitted below.
Authentication algorithm: Suppose that the source generates a multimedia
codestream with an identifier Sid. The authentication is on the packet level. Given
a packet P = L0k    kLm, the source performs the following to output an authenti-
cated packet P 0 = L00k    kL0m.
Step A1. Compute hm = H(Lmkm) as the hash for the top enhancement layer, and
compute hi = H(hi+1kLiki) for all 0 < j  m  1.
Step A2. Compute h0 = HMAC(h1kL0k0kSid; kMAC).
Step A3. Set L0m = Lm, L0i = hi+1kLi for 1  i  m  1, and L00 = h1kL0kh0.
Step A4. Output P 0 = L00kL01k    kL0m. 
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Verification algorithm: A user verifies every packet P 0 in a received codestream
using the HMAC key kMAC . Suppose that at transcoding, the proxy removes t of
m enhancement layers from every packet. Let P^ = L^0k    kL^m t be a received
packet.
Step V1. For all 0 < i  m  t, parse L^i into h^i+1kLi and parse L^0 into h^1kL0kh^0.
Step V2. Set hm t+1 = h^m t+1 and compute hi = H(hi+1kLiki) for all 0 < i 
m  t.
Step V3. Compute h0 = HMAC(h1kL0k0kSid; kMAC).
Step V4. If h0 = h^0, P^ is accepted and output P = L0k    kLm t; otherwise, P^ is
dropped.
3.4 Security and Discussions
In the signature-based authentication scheme, the source’s signature is computed
over the concatenation of the hashes of all n packets where each hash carries the
accumulated hashes of all enhancement layers residing in the same packet. As long
as the hash function and the signature scheme are secure, the resulting authentica-
tion scheme is secure in the sense that any malicious modifications on the packets
will be detected by the verification algorithm. The DECS coding scheme has no
impact on security, it simply protects all the hashes so that the end user can still re-
cover all hashes and therefore verify the signature in spite of packet loss. Similarly,
the HMAC-based authentication scheme is secure as long as the underlying HMAC
algorithm is secure. The security of both schemes can be proved formally using
reduction [40], by showing that breaking the security of the authentication schemes
leading to breaking of the hash function, signature scheme or HMAC algorithm.
The signature-based authentication scheme requires that the public key of the
source be distributed to end users in a public but authenticated manner. This can be
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done for example by embedding the public key in the client software. The HMAC-
based authentication scheme uses secret keys for HMAC computation which nor-
mally requires the existence of a key distribution center. Another advantage of the
signature-based scheme is that it provides source non-repudiation but at the ex-
pense of introducing more computational overhead due to use of signature, as will
be shown in the next section.
3.5 Performance and Discussions
With reference to the source-proxy-user framework, the following metrics are de-
fined in order to evaluate the performance of an authentication scheme designed for
scalable multimedia codestreams:
 Computation time. The amount of time needed by the source as well as the
proxy to generate authentication information for a group of n packets.
 Verification delay: The amount of time needed by a user to verify a group of
q packets, k  q  n.
 Per-packet authentication information (Communication overhead). The
amount of authentication information contained in a packet.
 Buffer size. The buffer space needed at the source and user in order to verify
and process the packets.
 Authentication probability (Loss-resiliency). The percentage of packets that
are received and verifiable.
 Proxy transparency. The need for proxies to be aware of the authentication
mechanism.
The two proposed authentication schemes, namely the Signature- and HMAC-
based schemes proposed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively, are analyzed in com-
parison to the FAS and PAS in [96] and the Hash-Chaining scheme in [32] since
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all of them can be applied for authentication of generic scalable multimedia code-
streams. As the Hash-Chaining scheme has been described in Section 3.1, the fol-
lowing discussion presents a brief overview of the FAS and PAS schemes.
Parameter Value Description
jBLj 533 bytes Average size of the base layer in a packet
jELj 133 bytes Average size of an enhancement layer in a packet
jLj 213 bytes Average size of a layer in a packet
m 4 The number of enhancement layers
t 2 The number of discarded enhancement layers
jH(:)j, jMACj 20 bytes Size of the output of a one-way function and a
HMAC function
jj 128 bytes Size of a digital signature
tshash, t
s
hmac 0.5498 s Time taken by the source and proxy to compute
tphash, t
p
hmac a hash with 64-byte input block
tuhash, t
u
hmac 77.016 s Time taken by a user device to compute a hash
with 64-byte input block
tsSig 1.48 ms Time taken by the source to generate a signature
tuVfy 27.2 ms Time taken by the user device to verify a signature
jHj 20n+ 4 Size of packet group hashH assuming 4 bytes for
group and codestream identifier Gid and Sid
Table 3.2: List of parameters
Both FAS and PAS perform authentication on a group G of n packets, each
containing a base layer and m enhancement layers. For each packet Pi, the
hash of layer j is computed as hi;j = H(Li;jkj) where Li;j denotes the jth
layer of Pi. In FAS, the packet hash hi = H(
Lm
j=0 hi;j) is the hash of the
XOR of all layer hashes while in PAS, the packet hash is generated as hi =
H(H(Li;0kH(Li;1kH(   kH(Li;m))))ki). For both schemes, the packet group hash
is computed as H = H(h1;    ; hnkGidkSid), where Gid and Sid are the group and
codestream identifiers respectively. TheH is digitally signed and the n hashes along
with the signature are encoded using the technique in [60].
The comparison is based on a group of n packets and the parameters used in the
evaluation are shown in Table 3.2. These parameters are chosen as follow: Taking
a practical example of an encoded scalable codestream from [92], where a quality
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scalable sequence “Mobile” [3] at 15 frames-per-second with a base layer of 64
kbps, and m = 4 enhancement layers is obtained. Each consecutive enhancement
layer increases the bit-rate to 80, 96, 112 and 128 kbps, respectively. Let jBLj,
jELj and jLj respectively denote the size of the base layer, enhancement layer and
the average size of a scalable layer component in a frame (in this case, jBLj = 533
bytes, jELj = 133 bytes and jLj = 213 bytes averaging over 15 frames).
In this setting, assume that the proxy removes t = 2 enhancement layers from
the original codestream. In addition, assume that the time taken by the source and
proxy to compute a hash on a 64-byte input block tfs;pghash is 0.5498 s while the time
for the source to generate a signature tsSig is 1.48 ms [13]. On the other hand, the
time taken for a HP Hx 2790 with a 624MHz processor1 to compute a hash on a 64-
byte input block, tuhash, is 7.7016 s while the time to verify a signature, t
u
Vfy, is 2.72
ms [72]. However, considering that 90-95% of the CPU processing time is used for
multimedia processing, let tuhash = 77:016s and t
u
Vfy = 27:2ms. In addition, let
tiMAC = t
i
hash for i 2 fs; p; ug.
Table 3.3 shows the analytical results on the performance of the FAS, PAS,
Hash-Chaining, Signature- and HMAC-based authentication schemes.
1This setting is chosen since most of the latest generation smartphones use processors of similar
performance.
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Figure 3.3: Source computation time (in milliseconds) with respect to the number
of packets in a group, n, for the FAS, PAS, Hash-Chaining, Signature- and HMAC-
based authentication schemes.
3.5.1 Computation time at source and proxy
Figure 3.3 shows the source computation time for the schemes under different val-
ues of n, assuming the DECS encoding/decoding overhead is negligible. Among
all, PAS has the highest computation time due to the use of progressive hash fol-
lowed by the Signature-based, FAS and Hash-Chaining schemes, all exhibiting al-
most identical computation time. A significant gap is observed in the computation
time for the HMAC-based scheme against those of the other schemes. This is be-
cause the HMAC-based scheme replaces the costly signature generation with a fast
HMAC computation.
Computation time incurred at a proxy depends on whether the authentication
scheme is proxy-transparent. The FAS and PAS schemes require the proxy to com-
pute authentication information of removed layers on the fly. Hence, their com-
putation time is linear to the number of removed layers. On the other hand, the
Signature-, HMAC-based and the Hash-Chaining schemes are proxy-transparent as
all necessary authentication information are already in the packets and no cost is
incurred at the proxy. Among them, the Signature- and HMAC-based schemes are
more desirable than the Hash-Chaining scheme as the latter does not tolerate packet
loss.
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3.5.2 Per-packet authentication information (communication
overhead)
The FAS, PAS and Signature-based schemes employed ECC to combat packet loss.
Authentication information of a group of n packets is partitioned into k symbols,
ECC-coded and the resulting n symbols are dispersed across the n packets such that
receiving at least k of n packets in the group will ensure recovery of the authenti-
cation information. Hence, the per-packet authentication information is inversely
proportional to k and k is determined based on the packet loss probability p; if p is
expected to be high, then k has to be small to accommodate more parity checks.
For a source preparing a multimedia codestream for distribution, it first estimates
the anticipated packet loss probability p. Then, it selects a value , 0    1,
such that with k = n data packets, an acceptable (as determined by the source)
authentication probability under loss probability p can be achieved. With the values
of k and n, the per-packet authentication information can then be calculated as
shown in Table 3.3.
As such, before transcoding, for the FAS, PAS and Signature-based schemes,
the per-packet authentication information increases linearly with p while for the
Hash-Chaining and HMAC-based schemes, it remains constant regardless of p be-
cause each packet can be individually authenticated. Figure 3.4 shows the per-
packet authentication overhead as a ratio (i. e., authentication data over packet
length) at p = 0:5 and k = 0:3n so as to achieve an authentication probability
of  0:97. As shown in Figure 3.4(a), before transcoding, the Signature-based
scheme has the highest ratio, followed by the Hash-Chaining, HMAC-based, FAS
and PAS schemes. FAS and PAS have the lowest ratio because each packet in the
three other schemes incorporated authentication information of all layers within the
packet. However, it is worth noting that after transcoding, although the ratio of the
Signature-based scheme remains the highest, it is now followed by FAS and PAS,
then the Hash-Chaining and HMAC-based schemes as shown in Figure 3.4(b). A
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Figure 3.4: Per-packet authentication information (in ratio) vs. number of pack-
ets in a group, n, for the Signature-, HMAC-based, Hash-Chaining, FAS and PAS
schemes, where p = 0:5 and k = 0:3n.
more significant increase (6.3%) is observed in the ratio of FAS and PAS compared
to the others. Such increase is due to the reason that after transcoding, additional
authentication information of the removed layers needed to be incorporated into the
packets of FAS and PAS schemes.
3.5.3 Verification delay at the user
Similar to the per-packet authentication overhead, the verification delay at the end
user side is also indirectly affected by the parameter k, i.e. the number of received
packets q where k  q  n. Intuitively, the verification delay will be longer when p
is low. Figure 3.5 compares the verification delay of the schemes with respect to n
for p = 0:5 and k = 0:3n. In this figure, the Hash-Chaining scheme has the longest
verification delay because all of the n packets have to be received and verified in
order to authenticate a packet group. It is then followed by the Signature-based,
FAS and PAS schemes having almost identical verification delays. The HMAC-
based authentication scheme has a constant verification delay equivalent to that of
verifying a single packet because it allows user to check the integrity of individual
packets, rather than an entire packet group.
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Figure 3.5: Verification delays (in milliseconds) with respect to the number of pack-
ets in a group n for the Signature-, HMAC-based authentication scheme, FAS, PAS
and Hash-Chaining scheme (p = 0:5; k = 0:3n).
3.5.4 Authentication probability (loss-resiliency)
In the proposed Signature-based authentication scheme, a packet group can be ver-
ified successfully only if the number of lost packets in a group is (n   k) or less.
Assuming independent packet loss, the probability of successful authentication can
be modeled as
PSuccess =
n kX
i=0

n
i

pk(1  p)n i
where p is the loss probability. Figure 3.6 shows the authentication probability
respective to different per-packet authentication information. With approximately
115 bytes of per-packet authentication information ( 0:09% of the packet size),
the Signature-based scheme can achieve a 99% authentication probability when p =
0:5.
From the above results, the following can be concluded:
 The Hash-Chaining scheme is not suitable for multimedia distribution over
packet-lossy networks because it cannot tolerate packet loss while the
HMAC-based scheme is the most robust against network loss as each packet
is individually verifiable.
 For applications which are not sensitive to delays, the Signature-based, FAS
or PAS schemes can be used. For applications requiring minimal delay, the
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Figure 3.6: Authentication probability vs. per-packet authentication information
(bytes) for the Signature-based scheme under different packet loss probabilities p
(assuming n = 128 packets).
HMAC-based scheme outperforms the others.
 Although the FAS and PAS have the lowest initial authentication ratio, they
exhibit similar performance as the Signature- and HMAC-based schemes af-
ter transcoding (note that limited bandwidth often occurs in the proxy-user
communication link). Hence, the Signature- and HMAC-based schemes are
better choices since they are proxy-transparent while the FAS and PAS are
not.
 For applications requiring non-repudiation of origin service, only schemes
using digital signatures, such as the Signature-based, FAS and PAS schemes,
can be used. Though the HMAC-based scheme outperforms all the other
schemes, it only provides codestream authentication, not non-repudiation,
service.
The authentication schemes proposed in [16], [32] and [29] are based on the
Merkle hash tree. In these schemes, a leaf node is the hash of a layer in a frame,
an interior node is the hash of concatenation of its children, and the root represents
the hash of the frame. This set of roots then form the leaves of another hash tree,
the root of which represents the hash of a group of frames. In these schemes, the
source needs at least 2dlog2(n(m+1))+1e   1 hash computations for tree construction
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assuming n frames in a group, each frame having (m + 1) layers. Furthermore,
the schemes are not proxy-transparent as the proxy needs to incorporate the hash
of the removed layer and/or hashes of subtrees covering the removed layers to the
packets. To provide proxy transparency, each leaf node needs to carry a signature
generated on the root and hashes of the siblings nodes on the path to the root node (
log2(m+1) Shash). This incurs a high computation and communication overhead.
3.6 Discussions
Two authentication schemes for generic scalable multimedia codestreams are pro-
posed. The first scheme, namely the Signature-based authentication scheme, uses a
hash chain to model the scalability structure of layers within a frame coupled with
a digital signature to authenticate a group of frames. A double error correction cod-
ing scheme is used to provide loss resiliency with a low communication overhead.
The second scheme, namely the HMAC-based authentication scheme, replaces the
signature with a HMAC and offers packet-level authentication with a lower compu-
tation cost and communication overhead. Both schemes have the salient features of
proxy-transparency with lower computation times and verification delays (for the
source and users respectively) compared to the existing schemes that are not proxy-
transparent. The HMAC-based authentication scheme has the lowest computation
and verification costs and the strongest resilience to packet loss, which makes it
highly suitable for low-end user devices with limited computation power and noisy
network access (such as wireless or mobile networks).
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Chapter 4
Cryptographic-based Authentication
for H.264/SVC
4.1 Introduction
The H.264/SVC multimedia coding standard encodes a video codestream into
3-dimensional scalability using hierarchical prediction and inter-layer prediction
structures. The hierarchical prediction structure provides temporal scalability; it
processes the frames within a Group-of-Frames (GOF) and groups them into sev-
eral temporal layers such that a frame in a higher temporal layer uses the preceding
and succeeding frames in the lower temporal layers as reference during decoding,
as shown in Figure 4.1. The frame in the lowest temporal layer, i.e., temporal base
layer, is intra-predicted (encoded by exploiting similarities within the frame itself)
while the frames in the enhancement layers are inter-predicted (encoded by ex-
ploiting similarities between adjacent frames). Temporal scalability is achieved by
discarding all frames in a higher temporal enhancement layer, which will reduce the
frame rate by half. Due to this structure, a GOF with T temporal layers consists of
2T 1 frames. In Figure 4.1, TL1 is the temporal base layer while TL2;TL3;TL4 are
the temporal enhancement layers.
Inter-layer prediction, which maximizes usage of lower layer information to im-
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Figure 4.1: On the left - Inter-layer prediction structure within an frame; On the
right - Hierarchical prediction structure within a GOF. Arrow pointing from A to B
indicates that A is the reference of B during decoding.
prove the rate-distortion efficiency of a higher layer, provides spatial (resolution)
and quality (PSNR, peak signal-to-noise ratio) scalabilities within a frame; it pro-
duces a base layer with the lowest resolution and PSNR, and multiple enhancement
layers which improve the resolution and/or PSNR. Note that each spatial layer may
have one or more quality layers and a higher spatial/quality layer utilizes a lower
spatial/quality layer as reference as shown on the left hand side of Figure 4.1. As
such, they are considered as a single dimension and are referred to as “SQ (spatial-
quality) scalability”; a frame can be transcoded to a lower spatial/quality frame by
discarding higher SQ layers.
Before an H.264/SVC codestream is transported over the network, it is orga-
nized into Network Abstraction Layer units (NALU). NALUs are designed to form
natural packet boundaries and can easily handle codestream transcoding. NALUs
are categorized into Video Coding Layer (VCL) NALUs and non-VCL NALUs.
The VCL NALUs carry coded video data while non-VCL NALUs carry associ-
ated additional information such as SVC header information that may assist certain
system operations. In the non-VCL NALUs category, the Supplemental Enhance-
ment Information (SEI) NALU (which is a non-VCLNALU that provides additional
information to assist the decoding or codestream manipulation process) that is in-
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cluded in a Payload Content Scalability Information (PACSI) NALU [90] is used to
achieve format-compliance for the proposed authentication scheme.
In the literature, the H.264/SVC codestream authentication scheme proposed in
[56] is the first cryptographic-based authentication scheme that preserves all three
dimensional scalabilities of an H.264/SVC codestream. In this scheme, the spatial
and quality layers within a frame are authenticated using a directed acyclic graph
and the temporal layers are authenticated using a hash chain. Authentication data
is protected using ECC (Erasure Correction Code) and packet replications. The
scheme is proxy-transparent and is shown to be resilient to bursty packet losses
using packet interleaving technique, but it incurs a relatively high communication
overhead and requires larger buffer size since it processes several GOFs (Group-of-
Frames) in one authentication. Similarly, there is also a longer source computation
time since the source’s signature is generated over several GOFs, which makes it
unsuitable for real-time applications. In addition, the use of hash chain on temporal
layers makes the scheme less robust to packet losses (as will be discussed in Section
4.2).
In this chapter, an improved codestream authentication scheme focusing on the
H.264/SVC Network Abstraction Layer Units (NALUs) is proposed. The proposed
scheme seamlessly integrates cryptographic algorithms and erasure correction code
to H.264/SVC codestreams such that the authenticated codestreams are format com-
pliant with the H.264 specifications and preserves the 3-dimensional scalability of
the original codestreams. Specifically, the proposed scheme is proxy-transparent,
robust to transcoding and highly loss-resilient. To realistically assess packet loss-
resiliency of the scheme, a Gilbert model [30] which closely characterizes packet
loss behavior in wireless mobile networks is utilized. The scheme is implemented
on a smart phone and its performance (e.g., computation costs, communication
overhead and loss resiliency) over a bursty network is studied and compared to
the scheme in [56].
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4.1.1 List of Notations
The list of notations used throughout this chapter is listed in Table 4.1.
Notation Description
H(:) One-way hash function, e.g., SHA-1 [23]
n Number of packets/frames in one Group-of-Frames (GOF)
m Number of spatial-quality enhancement layers in a frame
T Number of temporal layers in a codestream
t Number of enhancement layers removed by proxy in transcoding
Gid, Sid GOF and codestream identifier, respectively
q Number of authenticated packets received by the user
k Parameter for erasure correction code (ECC)
yi, si ECC codewords for packet hashes and signature, respectively
Table 4.1: List of notations
4.2 Authentication of H.264/SVC Codestreams
Assuming that a GOF G has T temporal layers, where TL1 is the temporal base
layer (BL) and TLl (l 2 [2; T ]) is the lth temporal enhancement layer (EL), thus
having a total of 2T 1 frames, i.e., G = [F1;F2;    ;F2T 1 ]. For the spatial-
quality (SQ) scalability, assume that each frame has m + 1 SQ layers, then,
Fi = fPrei;BLi;ELi;1;ELi;2;    ;ELi;mg, where Prei is a 4- or 5-byte non-VCL
Prefix NALU carrying the (spatial, quality, temporal) ID of BLi; BLi is the SQ BL
NALU and ELi;j is the jth SQ EL NALU of Fi. The proposed scheme exploits the
advantages of [32] and [60] and is tailored explicitly for authenticating H.264/SVC
codestreams.
In the proposed scheme, an H.264/SVC codestream is processed in GOFs, each
with n = 2T 1 frames. For each Fi, a hash chain is formed starting from the highest
SQ EL NALU as in [32] and its final hash (hash of BLi), denoted hi, is regarded
as the frame hash. Note that this hash chain approach makes the scheme proxy-
transparent since SQ scalability is achieved by discarding SQ NALUs starting from
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the highest SQ EL NALU. Next, the hash Hl of the temporal layer TLl is obtained
by concatenating hashes of all the frames in a temporal layer. A GOF hash is then
computed over hashes of all temporal layers and a source signature is generated on
the GOF hash. All the hashes are finally encapsulated into SEI NALUs.
To protect against authentication data loss, a combination of DECS (reviewed
in Chapter 3) and packet replications is employed. Unlike the scheme in [56] which
uses packet interleaving to convert burst loss to random loss pattern, no interleav-
ing is used in the proposed scheme in order to reduce decoding delays and to save
buffer space. The proposed scheme also overcomes a limitation in [56], where if
ECC is unable to recover frame hashes in temporal layer TLl, although the frames
in TLl+1;    ;TLT are received correctly and usable for decoding using error con-
cealment technique, they are unverifiable and must be discarded. In addition, as
will be shown later, the proposed scheme has a much lower communication over-
head and does not adversely affect the PSNR of the underlying codestream.
During system initialization, the source chooses a digital signature scheme
 = (Sig();Vfy()) with a secret key sk and a public key pk. The source’s sig-
nature on a messageM is computed as  = Sigsk(M). Given signature  and mes-
sageM , anyone can verify the authenticity ofM by checking whether Vfypk(;M)
returns 1. The source’s public key pk is distributed to all entities in the system
in an authenticated manner. In the following, the source takes as input a GOF
G = [F1;F2;    ;F2T 1 ] and outputs an authenticated GOF supporting SQ and tem-
poral scalability.
Authentication algorithm for spatial and quality (SQ) layers: To authenti-
cate the SQ NALUs within an frame, the source takes as input a frame Fi =
fPrei;BLi;ELi;1;    ;ELi;mg and produces an authenticated frame F0i (see Figure
4.2).
Step A1. Let hi;m = H(ELi;mkm);hi;j = H(ELi;jkjkhi;j+1); j 2 [1;m  1].
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Step A2. Output F0i = Fi
Sfhi;jgmj=1.
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Figure 4.2: Authentication of spatial-quality layers in an H.264/SVC frame. Dot-
ted arrow represents calculation of hash value, solid arrow indicates the action of
appending.
As mentioned earlier, the hash hi;j is put into an SEI NALU with the same
(spatial, quality, temporal)-ID as ELi;j 1 for format compliance and transparent
transcoding purposes. Note that the SQ dependency structure may sometimes be
a directed acyclic graph depending on encoding configurations. In this case, a sim-
ilar approach as in [56] can be employed. Thus, some NALUs may carry several
hashes, but the total number of hashes within an frame remains the same.
Authentication algorithm for temporal layers and GOF: At this stage, the
source has a group G0 containing the set of frames [F01;F
0
2;    ;F02T 1 ]. In the fol-
lowing, the source further operates on the frames within G0 to support temporal
scalability.
Step A3. For each F0i in G0, compute the hash of F
0
i as hi = H(BLikikhi;1).
Step A4. Let nl be the number of frames in temporal layer TLl, then TLl =
[F0i1 ;F
0
i2
;    ;F0inl ]
1. For each temporal layer TLl (l 2 [1; T ]), compute the
temporal layer hash as Hl = H(hi1khi2k    khinlkl).
1Note that n1 + n2 +   + nT = 2T 1.
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Example: Temporal layer 4, TL4
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Figure 4.3: Generation and placement of DECS-EN codewords for frame hashes
within a temporal layer. Dotted arrow represents calculation of hash value, bold
solid arrow indicates the action of appending.
Step A5. Compute the GOF hash as HGOF = H(H1kH2k    kHTkpkkGidkSid),
whereGid is the GOF identifier and Sid is the codestream identifier. Compute
 = Sigsk(HGOF ).
Step A6. For each temporal layer TLl (l 2 [1; T ]), generate the codeword:
(hi1kyi1 ; hi2kyi2 ;    ; hinlkyinl ) DECS-ENnl;kl(hi1 ; hi2 ;    ; hinl )
and let F0ib  F0ib
S
yib (1  b  nl). Therefore, in TLl, receiving any kl SQ
BL NALUs and the DECS code symbols yib allows the user to recover the
hashes of all frames in TLl and hence reconstruct Hl (see Figure 4.3).
Step A7. Let S = H1kH2k    kHTk. Output the authenticated GOF as G0 =
[F01;F
0
2;    ;F02T 1 ]
S
S, where S is also placed in an SEI NALU as in Figure
4.4.
In essence, the source generates a signature over all temporal layer hashes in a
GOF, each temporal layer hash is computed over the hashes of all its frames, and
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Figure 4.4: Authentication of temporal layers and GOF, and the formation of NALU
S; dotted arrow indicates the calculation of hash value.
the hash of a frame carries the accumulated hashes of its SQ NALUs.
The source uses DECS in each temporal layer to protect the frame hashes. If
a user wishes to obtain a particular temporal layer but some of its frames are lost,
then DECS can recover the lost frame hashes; otherwise, the user simply discards
all the received frames in that temporal layer and proceeds to verify frames in all
other temporal layers. Note that this cannot be achieved by the scheme in [56]
because temporal layers are authenticated using a hash chain. In [56], the nT frame
hashes in TLT are concatenated, segmented into kT 1 pieces, ECC encoded into
nT 1 codewords and appended to the nT 1 frames in TLT 1. For each frame in
TLl; l 2 [1; T   1], the frame hash is then computed from the codeword it carries,
along with its SQ NALU. The frame hash in TL1 carries the accumulated hashes of
higher layer frames and it is regarded as the GOF hash. As a result, in any temporal
layer TLl, if less than kl ECC codewords are received, the frames hashes in TLl+1
cannot be recovered and consequently, all frames in the higher temporal layers must
be discarded. In addition, due to the hierarchical prediction structure, nl 1 = 12nl,
ECC coding nl hashes such that receiving kl 1 (kl 1 < nl 1) can recover all nl
hashes resulted in a very high communication overhead. On the other hand, the use
of DECS within a temporal layer incurs a much lower communication overhead in
the proposed scheme.
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Note that for a codestreamwith a large number of temporal layers (e.g., T > 20),
the computation costs for both the source and user may become non-negligible. In
this case, the authentication scheme could be modified to selectively combine one
or more temporal layers and compute a single hash (and DECS) for the temporal
layers. This will improve the scheme efficiency but at the expense of compromis-
ing the degree of scalability of the original codestream. To this end, note that as
the number of temporal layers increases, so does the GOF size, i.e., the number of
frames in a GOF is equal to 2T 1, where T is the number of temporal layers. Al-
though a larger GOF size will improve the codestream quality, but it also result in a
longer decoding delay and a lower resiliency to loss as the gap between two intra-
predicted frames becomes larger. Hence, the GOF size is commonly restricted to a
small value and the best coding efficiency is achieved for GOF sizes between 8 and
32, i.e., T = 4 and 6, respectively [75][82]. Furthermore, current standard defini-
tion videos are encoded at either 25 or 30 frames per second whereas the latest ultra
high definition television can support up to 60 frames per second [2][21][22]. As
GOF size is restricted to be equal or less than the intended frame rate, the number
of temporal layers is also restricted to 4  T  6.
Because the authentication data S in Step A7 carries the signature, it is important
for the SEI NALU carrying S be received, thus, to increase the probability of it being
received, several replications of this SEI NALU is transmitted. In Section 4.3, it is
shown that by transmitting three copies of this NALU, a near 98% verification rate
in typical wireless mobile networks can be achieved.
Transcoding algorithm: Upon receiving an authenticated GOF G0 =
[F01;F
0
2;    ;F02T 1 ] from the source, a proxy performs transcoding operation ac-
cording to network bandwidth or user device capabilities by discarding some
NALUs, starting from the highest SQ EL NALUs and/or the frames in the high-
est temporal layer.
Suppose that the proxy desires to remove t (t < m) SQ EL NALUs and
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s (s < T ) temporal layers, it first discards frames in temporal layers TLT ;TLT 1,
   , TLT s+1. Let T 0 = T   s   1, then G0 = [F01;F02;    ;F02T 0 ]. For each
F0i (i 2 [1; 2T 0 ]), the proxy discards EL0i;m;EL0i;m 1;    ;EL0i;m t+1 to form the
new F00i = fyi;Prei;BLi; hi;1;ELi;1; hi;2;ELi;2;    ; hi;m0 ;ELi;m0 ; hi;m0+1g, where
m0 = m   t. Finally, the proxy also discards the corresponding SEI NALUs and
transmits the transcoded GOF G00 = [F001;F
00
2;    ;F002T 0 ] to end users. Note that in
this process, the proxy simply discards NALUs and/or frames without needing to
understand the authentication mechanism.
Verification algorithm: A user performs the following verification steps as she
receives a GOF ~G = [~F1; ~F2;    ; ~F2T 0 ].
Step V1. If the SEI NALU containing ~S is received, go to Step 2. Otherwise, ~G is
not verifiable and is discarded.
Step V2. Parse ~Fi into fyi;Prei;BLi; hi;1;ELi;1;    ; hi;m0 ;ELi;m0g if m0 = m, or
into fyi;Prei;BLi; hi;1;ELi;1;    ; hi;m0 ;ELi;m0 ; hi;m0+1g ifm0 < m.
Step V3. For each ~Fi, compute its hash starting from the m0th SQ EL NALU, i.e.
~hi;m0 = H(ELi;m0km0) if m0 = m, or ~hi;m0 = H(ELi;m0km0khi;m0+1) if m0 <
m, and in other cases, ~hi;j = H(ELi;jkjk~hi;j+1); finally, ~hi = H(BLikik~hi;1).
Step V4. Group the frames based on the temporal layer ID, compute the temporal
layer hash as ~Hl = H(~hi1k~hi2k    k~hinlkl). In the case of packet loss, as long
as kl or more SQ BL NALUs and SEI NALUs are received, the user performs
DECS-DE to recover the missing frame hashes. If less than kl SQBLNALUs
and SEI NALUs are received, discard the remaining received NALUs.
Step V5. Compute the GOF hash as ~HGOF = H( ~H1k ~H2k    k ~HTkpkkGidkSid)
where ~HT 0+1;    ; ~HT are recovered from ~S.
Step V6. Verify the signature  against ~HGOF . If the verification outputs true, i.e.,
1 Vfypk(; ~HGOF ), accept ~G; otherwise, reject it.
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Forbidden Sequence Replacement
0000000 000000300
0000001 000000301
0000002 000000302
0000003 000000303
Table 4.2: Forbidden sequences and their replacements.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
The proposed scheme is implemented and integrated into an open source SVC de-
coder (Opensvc [27]) on the Android V1.5 platform. In addition, an open source
ECC [65] and signature software [59] which, respectively, implement the Reed-
Solomon Code [68] and the RSA signature [73] with the hash function SHA-1 [23]
are utilized. These C source codes are cross-compiled on the ARM-based smart
phone on a X86-based desktop. The binary code is encapsulated in JNI (JAVA Na-
tive Interface) and JAVA renders the User Interface.
In the implementation, a slight modification on the proposed scheme is per-
formed as follow. Firstly, note that 0x00000001 and 0x000001 are forbidden se-
quences in the H.264/SVC codestream because they mark the NALU boundary [84].
If such sequences occur in authentication data, they are replaced as shown in Table
4.2 and recovered as the NALU is read from the codestream. Secondly, knowledge
of the position of each frame in a GOF is necessary for DECS to recover the frame
hashes in the event of packet loss. Such position information is inserted into the SEI
NALU corresponding to the SQ BL NALU.
4.3.1 Loss-Resiliency and Communication Overhead
A multimedia codestream can tolerate loss at the cost of a lower PSNR, but an au-
thenticated codestream has a smaller window of tolerance because all data in a GOF
must be discarded if it cannot be verified. In the following, loss-resiliency of the
proposed scheme is studied by measuring its verification rate, defined as the ratio of
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Pgb
Pbg
Pgg Pbb
Figure 4.5: Gilbert channel model
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Bit-rate (kbps) 500 500 2000 2000
MTU (bytes) 300 1200 300 1200
Pgb 7.43e-04 2.90e-03 2.50e-04 7.30e-04
Pbg 4.92e-03 2.89e-02 2.49e-03 6.79e-03
Ploss 1.31e-01 0.91e-01 0.91e-01 0.97e-01
 204 34 402 148
% loss 97% 65% 48% 71%
Table 4.3: Gilbert model parameters.
“the number of verifiable NALUs” to “the number of received NALUs”, under the
Gilbert model [30] (see Figure 4.5). In contrast to the independent loss model, the
Gilbert model is a more realistic approximation to real wireless mobile networks.
In this model, the two states have different packet loss probabilities. The proba-
bilities Pgg, Pgb, Pbg, Pbb respectively represents the state transition probabilities of
“Good-to-Good”, “Good-to-Bad”, “Bad-to-Good” and “Bad-to-Bad”.
In [24], the authors formulated a packet loss model aimed at H.264 video trans-
mission over the IEEE 802.11g Wireless LANs. This model assumes no packet loss
in “Good” state and some packet loss in “Bad” state. In the following experiments, it
is assumed that packet is always lost in the “Bad” state and the measurement data in
[24] is adapted as listed in Table 4.3). The four scenarios in Table 4.3 respectively
depicts a wireless transmission for low (500 kbps) and high (2000 kbps) bit-rate
codestreams under a relatively small (300 bytes) and large (1200 bytes) Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU) size.
The average packet loss probability Ploss increases with burst loss length  (in
packets), packet rate and MTU size. From Table 4.3, Scenario 1 has the highest
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Figure 4.6: Probability of receiving NALU S vs. number of copies of NALU S.
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Figure 4.7: Probability of temporal layer authentication vs. its DECS parameter.
Ploss while Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 exhibit similar Ploss. This is because Scenario
1 has a larger  and a higher packet rate compared to Scenarios 2 and 4, while
between the latter two, Scenario 4 has a larger , packet rate as well as MTU size.
The lower Ploss in Scenario 3 could be attributed to its small MTU size, however,
its high packet rate results in the largest . A large  in a multimedia codestream
causes a lower verification rate for low bit-rate codestreams compared to high bit-
rate codestreams because of a larger percentage of video/authentication data that
is lost (% loss) in one burst. Thus, for low bit-rate codestreams, the verification
rate will be lower in Scenario 1 compared to Scenario 2 due to a larger % loss
in Scenario 1. For high bit-rate codestreams, the verification rate will be lower in
Scenario 4 compared to Scenario 3 even though Scenario 3 has the largest . This is
due to the smaller MTU size in Scenario 3 where even a larger  does not adversely
affect the % loss as that in Scenario 4. The above observation is in agreement with
the results of the following computer simulations.
49
The verification rates of the proposed scheme in all scenarios are simulated, with
the following assumptions:
1. The channel does not have a retransmission mechanism.
2. Large NALUs are divided into small packets according to the maximum trans-
mission unit (MTU).
3. The entire NALU will be discarded when one or more of its packets are lost.
4. Unless otherwise stated, the GOF size jGOFj = 32. Also, it is assumed that
the scheme in [56] computes one signature over 5 GOFs.
5. Since the SEI NALU containing S carries the temporal layer hashes and the
GOF signature, it is transmitted multiple times to increase the probability of
it being received. As shown in Figure 4.6, repeating this NALU three times
guarantees at least a 0.98 probability of it being received in all four scenarios.
6. Since DECS is used in each temporal layer to increase the probability of a
temporal layer being authenticated, the DECS parameter kl for each tem-
poral layer TLl that maximizes this probability is chosen. Figure 4.7 shows
the probabilities of authenticating temporal layers in Scenario 1, which has
the worst performance among the four scenarios. From the figure, setting
(k1; k2; k3; k4, k5; k6) = (1; 1; 1; 2; 5; 10) gives a  0:98 probability of au-
thentication, where k1 = k2 = 1 is due to the hierarchical prediction structure
in H.264/SVC.
In the following, the loss-resiliency, communication overhead, computation cost
and buffer size requirement of the proposed scheme are examined, assuming the
parameters calibrated above.
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Figure 4.8: Verification rate with and without SQNALU hash protection vs. number
of SQ layers.
4.3.2 Loss resiliency w.r.t. number of SQ layers
To verify the authenticity of a frame, the frame hash must be reconstructed from
hash-chaining the frame’s SQ NALUs. However, in the event of loss, the hash chain
can be broken. An intuitive solution is to protect the SQ NALU hashes usingDECS
. More specifically, for each ELi;j (i.e. the jth SQ EL NALU of Fi), use DECS to
protect hi;j+1khi;j such that if ELi;j is lost, hi;j+1 can be used to authenticate ELi;j+1
and hi;j can be used to reconstruct the chain. Assuming DECS computation is
negligible, this method incurs a higher communication overhead, i.e. instead of
having one hash per SQ NALU, there are effectively three hashes per SQ NALU.
Nevertheless, the verification rate of the proposed scheme is simulated with and
without SQNALU hash protection for Scenario 1 with the above measure, assuming
that the size of every SQ layer in a frame is the same. Figure 4.8 shows that the
verification rate drops when the number of SQ layers increases. Interestingly, the
verification rate is not adversely affected whether or not the SQ NALU hashes are
protected. Thus, for the interest of communication overhead, SQ NALU hashes are
left unprotected. However, note that in [56], every SQ NALU hash is replicated
twice to counter packet loss.
Next, the verification rate of the proposed scheme is compared with the scheme
in [56] for different SQ layer sizes within the frames of a codestream. Assuming
that there are two spatial layers, where the size of the BL is jFj=2x for x = 1;    ; 6.
To illustrate this, Figure 4.9 shows the relative size of the spatial BL compared to
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Figure 4.9: Different SQ layer size for cases C1, C2, C3 and C4.
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Figure 4.10: Verification rate for different SQ layer sizes defined in Figure 4.9.
the spatial EL for x = 1;    ; 4. Let Ci denote the case for x = i. In Figure 4.10,
it is shown that the verification rates for both schemes do not vary significantly
under different SQ layer sizes in all scenarios. One possible reason is that each SQ
NALU is divided into several segments according to the MTU size, but the resulting
number of segments is far less than the average burst length. Thus, varying the sizes
of SQ layers will not significantly affect the verification rate.
4.3.3 Loss resiliency w.r.t. different SQ layer structures
As mentioned in subsection 4.2, the SQ dependency structure may not be a chain
but a directed acyclic graph (DAG). The consequence of a DAG structure is that an
SEI NALU for a lower SQ NALU may carry more than one hashes instead of only
a single 20-byte hash (computed from its immediate higher SQ NALU). This may
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Figure 4.11: Different SQ dependency structures to be tested. Direction of arrow
from A to B indicates that A is verifiable if and only if B is received and verifiable.
result in a higher loss probability during transmission, rendering the “depending”
higher SQ layer unverifiable. To examine the effect of different DAG structures
on the verification rate of the proposed scheme, several SQ dependency structures
are defined (see Figure 4.11), and a structure i is denoted as Gi . An SQ NALU is
considered verifiable if either one of the following two conditions is met:
 (Case 1) It is the SQ BL NALU - if it is received, it is verifiable
 (Case 2) It is not the SQ BL NALU - if it is received, and if the SQ NALU
where its hash value is appended to is received and verifiable
Based on the above criteria, it can be seen that case G1 is the most vulnerable
to packet loss because if any one of the SQ NALUs is lost, then the entire chain
is unverifiable. On the other hand, case G6 is the most resilient to packet loss -
as long as the SQ BL NALU is received, then any one of the SQ EL NALU is
verifiable as long as it is received. Figure 4.12 shows the verification rate of the
proposed scheme under different SQ dependency structures, namely from case G1
to G6. Interestingly, the verification rate does not vary significantly for different
DAG structures in each scenario. One possible explanation is that since there are
only four SQ layers, the maximum number of hashes an SEI NALU will carry is
three. As the MTU size is set to 300 bytes (minimum), each SEI NALU can carry
up to 15 hashes without being segmented, thus, as long as the SEI NALU is received,
the SQ NALUs are verifiable.
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Figure 4.12: Verification rate of the proposed scheme under different SQ depen-
dency structures defined in Figure 4.11.
4.3.4 Loss resiliency w.r.t. number of temporal layers
In the following, the verification rates of the proposed scheme and the scheme in
[56] for different number of temporal layers (i.e. different GOF sizes) are examined.
Since the best coding efficiency is achieved for number of temporal layers between
four to six layers, i.e. GOF sizes between 8 and 32 [75][82], these cases and their
impact on the verification rate of the proposed scheme and the scheme in [56] are
simulated.
As shown in Figure 4.13, the verification rate of the proposed scheme in all
scenario is higher than that of the scheme in [56]. For both schemes, the verification
rate decreases as the number of temporal layer increases. This is because as the
number of temporal layer increases, the GOF size also increases while the number
of NALU S that carries the signature verifying the entire GOF remains fixed at
three. As such, with an increasing GOF size, the probability of receiving the NALU
S decreases. However, such decrease is to a small degree, as shown in Figure 4.13.
4.3.5 Loss resiliency w.r.t. transmission order
The verification rate of the proposed scheme by considering the codestream trans-
mission order is further studied. For an H.264/SVC codestream generated by JSVM
(Joint Scalable Video Model) [69], there are two types of codestream orders: 1)
video playback (Tx Play) and 2) preorder traversal (Tx PT) (see Figure 4.14 and
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Figure 4.13: Verification rate of the proposed scheme and the scheme in [56] under
different number of temporal layers.
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Figure 4.14: Preorder traversal, Tx PT
4.15) based on source’s encoding delay configuration Denc. When Denc is small,
frames will be encoded and transmitted in Tx Play order; when Denc is large
enough, Tx PT order will be used. Normally, Tx PT is used because it has less
intra-frame redundancy.
For the sake of comparison, the verification rates of the proposed scheme and
that of the scheme in [56] in both transmission orders are studied. Note that un-
like [56], the proposed scheme does not support MGS scalability. Therefore, in the
TL4
TL3
TL2
TL1
Figure 4.15: Video playback order, Tx Play
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Figure 4.16: Verification rate of the proposed scheme under different transmission
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Figure 4.17: Verification rate of the scheme in [56] under different transmission
orders.
implementation of the scheme in [56] (and also [58]), MGS scalability is not con-
sidered. Figures 4.16 and 4.17 show that with five SQ layers, both schemes have
similar verification rates for Tx Play while the proposed scheme has a higher ver-
ification rate for Tx PT. This is because as mentioned earlier, the scheme in [56]
authenticates temporal layers using a hash chain where the final hash is signed.
Note that in [56], the “temporal base layer” is a combination of TL2 and TL1. In
Tx PT, the frames in TL2 and TL1 are transmitted consecutively, which means that
they are likely to be lost in one burst. Moreover, since temporal layers are authen-
ticated using a hash chain, the loss of the lower layers renders the higher layers
unauthenticated.
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Figure 4.18: PSNR for the proposed scheme and the scheme in [56] vs. bit-rate.
4.3.6 Communication overhead
The proposed scheme achieves a high loss-resiliency with a sufficiently low com-
munication overhead. Considering a GOF size of 32 and that each frame has five
SQ layers (including SQ base layer), the proposed scheme appends a total of 3808
bytes per GOF while the scheme in [56] appends a total of 11620 bytes per GOF;
for a codestream with a specific bit-rate, the amount of authentication data results
in a lower effective video bit-rate, thus a lower PSNR (see Figure 4.18).
4.3.7 Computation Cost and Buffer Size
The primary computation cost is incurred by the verification delays for the digital
signature algorithm and hash function. The RSA signature verification delay on
a Samsung S5830@800MHz smart phone is 5.65ms per verification while SHA-
1 computation time is proportional to the codestream bit-rate since hash function
processes a block of 64-bit input at a time. Therefore, for jGOFj = 32, the proposed
scheme’s verification delay is about 5.92ms to 6.72ms per GOF on the smart phone
when the bit-rate is varied from 500 kbps to 2000 kbps. When the codestream
“Foreman” is encoded with one quality enhancement layer at resolution 352 288
on this platform, the decoding time is about 85ms per frame. The proposed scheme
only costs 6:72
8532 = 0:2% of the decoding time. Though the scheme in [56] incurs
even shorter verification delay because there is only one signature verification per
five GOFs, the verification delays in both schemes are negligible in a typical smart
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Source
buffer size
User buffer
size
User verification cost w.r.t.
decoding time
Proposed scheme 1 GOF 1 GOF 0:2%
Scheme in [56] 5 GOFs 1  5GOFs 0:08%
Table 4.4: Comparison of source and user delays and computation cost.
device today. Table 4.4 compares the required buffer sizes at the source and user,and
the user verification cost (compared to decoding time) of the proposed scheme with
those of the scheme in [56].
4.4 Discussions
A cryptographic-based authentication scheme for H.264/SVC video codestreams
over packet-lossy networks is proposed. The scheme preserves the scalability struc-
ture of H.264/SVC codestreams in the spatial, quality and temporal dimensions and
have several highly desirable features such as proxy-transparency, low communica-
tion overhead and low source and user computation costs and buffer requirements.
Packet loss resiliency of the scheme was studied by simulating transmission of au-
thenticated codestreams over a realistic bursty wireless mobile network character-
ized using a Gilbert model. Experimental results showed that the proposed scheme
achieves high verification rate over typical non-stationary, bursty packet-lossy wire-
less mobile networks. The proposed scheme was implemented and integrated with
an SVC decoder on an Android platform, and the measurement indicated that the
computation cost due to authentication is negligible.
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Chapter 5
Content-based Authentication for
Non-Scalable Codestreams
5.1 Introduction
Content-based authentication schemes authenticate the semantic meaning of a mul-
timedia object by extracting an invariant feature from the object and computing au-
thentication data (using keyed-hash function or digital signature algorithm) on the
feature. The integrity of the object can be verified as long as its feature (i.e., seman-
tic meaning) is unchanged. As transcoding is a content-preserving manipulation,
content-based solutions are more efficient in authenticating transcoded non-scalable
codestreams compared to cryptographic-based solutions.
It is worth noting that earlier work on content-based authentication first focused
on the authentication of images. In [8] and [36], the proposed scheme extracts and
authenticates features from the transform coefficients of JPEG and JPEG 2000 im-
ages, respectively. These schemes have been proven to be efficient and are able
to detect semantic-changing attacks on authenticated images. Since video is a se-
quence of frames, and each frame is essentially a still image, many existing content-
based authentication schemes for video codestreams adopt a similar design conven-
tion as that for images. The work of [18][44][81], for example, extract a feature
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from the frame’s coefficients (hereinafter called the payload), and show that the
feature can be used to detect semantic-changing attacks while remain unchanged un-
der content-preserving manipulations such as transcoding. For applications such as
surveillance videos that may lose vital details if transcoded, the work of [35][63] ex-
tract a fragile feature from the frame header and show that both semantic-changing
attacks and transcoding cause an avalanche change on the header parameters that
inevitably destroys the feature.
Existing content-based authentication schemes for non-scalable codestreams
may perform feature extraction in either the pixel, transform or codestream do-
main, as shown in Figure 5.1. A pixel-domain content-based authentication scheme
takes an input frame and extracts a pixel-domain feature from the frame. The fea-
ture extracted may be structural information such as edges [17], means of pixels
in 44 downsampled blocks [80] or optical flow of motion between frames [70].
The main advantage of pixel-domain content-based authentication schemes is the
robustness of the feature against transcoding, as important structural information
are commonly preserved after transcoding. However, they are more computation-
ally intensive since a user needs to fully decode the codestream before performing
verification. In addition, feature extraction in the pixel domain involves executing
a feature detector algorithm (e.g., Canny [9][17] or SIFT [50][70]), and processing
the detected feature using methods such as designing a Vector Quantization code-
book [80] or histograms of orientation of optical flow [70] in order to reduce the
feature size.
In retrospect, codestream-domain content-based authentication schemes such as
those in [55] [107] [108] work directly at the codestream level. This is achieved
by taking as input a watermark and the entropy-encoded codestream and identify-
ing the set of codewords used in the codestream. Then, by designing a mapping
between the used and unused codewords in the valid codespace, the used codeword
is either replaced by the unused codewords or kept unchanged depending on the
watermark bit. The main advantage of codestream-domain content-based authen-
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Figure 5.1: Three types of content-based authentication schemes.
tication schemes is the efficiency since verification can be performed directly at
the codestream level. However, the schemes are very sensitive to random errors
and transcoding; in addition, they require transmission of a detection metadata that
specifies the locations to allow correct watermark extraction. Care must also be
taken in order for the schemes to remain format compliant with minimal distortion
after codewords replacement.
Transform-domain content-based authentication schemes are designed to trade
off between efficiency, error-tolerance, perceptual distortion and robustness to
transcoding of the pixel- and codestream-based content-based authentication
schemes. In a transform-domain content-based authentication scheme such as those
in [18][44][81], the source extracts an invariant transform-domain feature from the
transform coefficients or header parameters and computes the authentication data,
which is then embedded back to the transform coefficients as a watermark. Dur-
ing verification, a user extracts feature from the received codestream, and veri-
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fies it against the extracted authentication data (i.e., watermark). Since transform-
domain parameters may change as a result of coding inconsistencies introduced
during transcoding, the transform-domain feature is not as robust to transcoding
as a pixel-domain feature. However, transform-domain content-based authentica-
tion schemes are more efficient compared to pixel-domain schemes since the user
performs only partial decoding in order to perform verification. Unlike codestream-
domain content-based authentication schemes, the feature extracted in a transform-
domain scheme is less sensitive to transmission errors while the watermark embed-
ding in the transform coefficients provides robustness to both perceptual distortion
and transcoding.
In this chapter, the existing transform-domain content-based authentication
schemes proposed for non-scalable codestreams are reviewed and a common se-
curity flaw in these schemes that can be exploited to mount semantic-changing at-
tacks in the transform domain is pointed out. Unlike images, where the payload
(coefficients) represent an image’s overall semantic meaning, the transform-domain
payload and the header of a video have a strong interdependency relationship. This
relationship, when maliciously exploited, changes the semantic meaning of the fi-
nal, decoded multimedia representation to a similar effect as attacks in the pixel
domain, and these attacks cannot be detected by existing schemes. The ways to
exploit such relationship are discussed and several attack examples as the results
of manipulating transform domain parameters are presented. Finally, an in-depth
discussion on the attacks that manipulate the header parameters, and the condition
of the attacks, given the attacker’s desired attack content, is presented. Note that
although the attacks are performed on H.264/AVC-encoded codestreams, they are
also applicable to videos encoded by other standards such as MPEG-2 and MPEG-4
due to the same underlying video coding concept.
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5.1.1 Transform-Domain Syntax of an H.264 Macroblock
In the H.264 standard, a prediction model takes as input a raw video frame and
outputs a residual frame. The raw frame is first partitioned into units (each of
size 1616 pixels) called macroblocks, which may be further partitioned into 16
(44)-blocks. Given a raw macroblock Ori, the prediction model searches for
the most perceptually similar macroblock within a searchable region, i.e., neigh-
bouring macroblocks in the same frame (intra prediction) or in adjacent frames
(inter-prediction), and uses the most similar macroblock as reference to generate a
prediction macroblock Pred. The prediction macroblock is (pixel-wise) subtracted
from the raw macroblock to obtain the residual macroblock Res as in Equation 5.1.
The residual macroblock is then transformed, quantized and entropy encoded to the
codestream domain.
Figure 5.2 shows the transform-domain syntax of an H.264 macroblock. In this
figure, parameter type indicates whether the macroblock is intra- or inter-predicted.
Each (intra/inter) macroblock can be partitioned into sub-blocks of different sizes,
which is conveyed by the parameter partition size. For an intra macroblock, predic-
tion mode conveys the Directional Prediction Mode (DPM) indicating the location
of reference macroblock(s) and the method of generating prediction macroblock;
for an inter macroblock, this parameter conveys the reference frame index pointing
to a previously-decoded frame and the Motion Vector (MV) indicating the displace-
ment of the reference macroblocks from the raw macroblock. Coded Block Pattern
(CBP) indicates the existence of non-zero coefficients in the macroblock, followed
by the Quantization parameter (QP). In the remainder of this chapter, these predic-
tion parameters are collectively referred to as the macroblock header whereas the
quantized luma and chroma coefficients are referred to as the macroblock payload.
At the decoder, the decoded macroblock Dec is obtained as in Equation 5.2, af-
ter reconstructing the prediction macroblock Pred (using the macroblock header)
and the residual macroblock Res (using the macroblock payload). Note that for a
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Figure 5.2: The transform-domain syntax of an H.264 macroblock.
non-tampered macroblock, the quantity  is due to lossy compression and is negli-
gible, and Dec is perceptually similar to Ori. From Equation 5.2, an interdependent
relationship between the macroblock header and payload can be observed; the ways
to exploit this relationship to achieve semantic-changing attacks in the transform
domain are discussed and demonstrated in the following sections.
Encoder: Res = Ori  Pred (5.1)
Decoder: Dec = Pred + Res = Ori+  (5.2)
5.1.2 Content-Based Authentication Model
In this subsection, a generic content-based authentication (CBA) model which is
followed by most of the CBA schemes in the literature is described. A transform-
domain CBA scheme for video works at the macroblock level, in compatible with
video coding standards such as MPEG-2, MPEG-4 and H.264 that use block-based
coding. Given a macroblock in the transform domain, a CBA scheme first identi-
fies the feature extraction domain and the prediction parameter(s) or coefficients to
extract feature F from. The feature F , together with the source’s private key sk,
serve as inputs to the feature authentication phase that outputs a watermark WF .
In the watermark embedding phase, a different secret key k is used to identify a
set of embedding locations and WF is embedded into the macroblock following
a set of embedding rules. The watermarked macroblock is then entropy encoded
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into a codestream and transmitted to a user. Upon receiving the codestream, the
user performs entropy-decoding and watermark extraction by identifying the ex-
traction domain, locations and extraction rules to output the watermark WF . The
user then performs the same feature extraction operation to output a feature F 0 of
the macroblock and verifies it against WF using the source’s public key pk (which
corresponds to the source’s private key sk) in the feature verification phase. Upon
successful verification, the user proceeds to decode the macroblock.
5.2 Classification of Existing Schemes
Existing CBA schemes for non-scalable codestreams are classified into two cate-
gories, namely payload- and header-protected CBA schemes.
5.2.1 Payload-Protected Schemes
Payload-protected schemes extract and authenticate a feature from the macroblock
payload (i.e., coefficients) that can be either robust or fragile to transcoding (as
surveyed in Chapter 2). The watermark computed from the feature is embed-
ded back into the coefficients in the payload, or into the prediction parame-
ters in the header. For embedding into payload, the rule of evaluating LSB
[18][81][88][100], zero/non-zero coefficients [102] or energy relationship between
coefficients [14][88] are used, whereas for embedding into header, the rule of eval-
uating LSB [44][74] of MVs is used.
5.2.2 Header-Protected Schemes
In the work of [35][63], a feature is extracted, respectively, from the DPMs of intra
frames and the partition sizes of macroblocks. Their schemes are shown to reliably
detect semantic-changing attacks as well as unauthorized transcoding due to the
fragile nature of header parameters. The watermark is embedded into the payload
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using the LSB evaluation rule due to limited embedding capacity in the header.
Remarks. Note that there are several CBA schemes that extract feature from the
payload and the motion vectors [45][76][100] in the header. For clarity sake, they
are not classified but as will be discussed and shown in the remainder of this chap-
ter, almost all prediction parameters in the header have interdependent relationship
with the payload that can be exploited to achieve semantic-changing attacks; these
schemes are still susceptible to attacks in the transform domain.
5.3 The Design Flaw and its Exploitation
The common flaw of existing transform-domain content-based authentication
(CBA) schemes is that the feature extracted is insufficient to truly represent the
video semantic. This is because they did not take into account the interdependent
relationship between prediction parameters in the macroblock header with the co-
efficients in the macroblock payload. By exploiting this relationship, attacks per-
formed in the transform domain can not only change the codestream semantic, they
are also undetectable by the CBA schemes.
5.3.1 Exploiting the Flaw in Payload-Protected Schemes
Unlike images where image pixels were directly transformed and quantized [77],
a video’s macroblock coefficients convey the relationship between the macroblock
pixel content and its prediction macroblock, i.e., the residual macroblock Res. If
an attacker finds an attack prediction macroblock Pred0 to replace the original pre-
diction macroblock Pred, the targeted macroblock Dec could be modified to the
attacker’s desired attack macroblock Dec0 (see Equation 5.2). The discussion here-
after is based at the (44)-block level since it is the smallest coding unit.
To find an attack prediction block, an attacker proceeds as follow. Firstly, iden-
tify the “searchable region” and the candidate reference blocks that generate the
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Figure 5.3: Example of finding an attack prediction block Pred0 by modifying DPM
value of a targeted block Dec in order to generate the desired attack block Dec0;
macroblock #264 is extracted from the Bridge sequence for content removal.
suitable Pred0 to obtain Dec0. In intra-prediction, the searchable region is the four
neighbouring blocks (left, above-and-to-the-left, above, and above-and-to-the-right
of) the targeted block whereas in inter-prediction, the searchable region is within an
area centering on the targeted block [104]. To replace Pred with Pred0, modify the
prediction mode (e.g., DPM, MV and reference frame index) of the targeted block
Dec. Figure 5.3 shows an example of finding an attack prediction block by modify-
ing the DPM of a targeted intra-predicted block in the “Bridge” sequence (refer to
Figure 5.7).
Depending on the video content, it is possible that a suitable Pred0 is unavailable.
If so, a workaround that indirectly modifies the residual block Reswithout being de-
tected by payload-protected schemes can be performed using the effect of QP. At the
encoder, a larger QP in forward quantization removes insignificant coefficients. At
the decoder, given a set of coefficients, a larger QP in inverse quantization magni-
fies the residual samples whereas a smaller QP suppresses the samples. If a decoder
receives a corrupted QP, inverse quantization results in a different set of coefficients
that may misrepresent the residual samples in Res. Note that this cannot be detected
by payload-protected schemes because the magnifying/suppressing happens during
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Figure 5.4: An example of finding an attack prediction block Pred0 by modifying
DPM and QP values of a targeted block Dec in order to generate the desired at-
tack block Dec0; macroblock #100 is extracted from the News sequence for content
removal.
the decoding process, which is only executed after integrity verification. Having
different QPs across macroblocks in a frame is not uncommon; macroblock-layer
rate control in H.264 has been proven to improve coding efficiency [52] whereas
earlier standards (e.g., MPEG-4) and the H.264 High Profile allow different QPs for
DC and AC coefficients [19][71]. An example of such attack is illustrated in Figure
5.4 on an intra-predicted macroblock extracted from the “News” sequence (refer to
Figure 5.5).
If the targeted macroblock spans across targeted and non-targeted content, it
is more complicated to modify its prediction mode because the attacker needs to
find a suitable attack prediction macroblock of the same size that changes only
the targeted content while keeping the non-targeted content intact. By modifying
the macroblock partition size, the targeted macroblock can be partitioned into sub-
blocks, such that the targeted content is isolated in a sub-block, and then perform a
search for the suitable attack prediction sub-block thereof.
Remarks. Attacks on payload-protected schemes involve replacing the original
prediction block with an attack prediction block in order to change the content of a
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targeted block. Given the searchable region which is constrained in one frame (intra
frames) or within the same video (inter frames), arbitrary content insertion attacks
cannot be realized. However, content removal and modification attacks are possible
as will be shown in Section 5.4. Also note that prediction mode parameters such as
DPM, MV and reference frame index are coded differentially between successive
blocks. If these parameters are changed, it may affect the corresponding parameter
of subsequent (targeted/non-targeted) blocks, causing them to use a wrong/different
prediction block for decoding. This may result in error propagation that occur in
the form of visual distortion on the decoded frame. In Section 5.4, an example of
such error propagation is illustrated, and the way to correct the visual distortion by
either restoring the prediction mode of affected blocks or by restricting their choice
of prediction block to a more suitable one is shown.
5.3.2 Exploiting the Flaw in Header-protected Schemes
Although header-protected schemes can detect both content-preserving and
semantic-changing manipulations, they are more insecure compared to payload-
protected schemes. Since the payload represents the residual block with samples
that are integers ranging from -255 to +255, an attacker can perform a simple
but powerful attack using reverse engineering. Since the user has no prior infor-
mation about the original block, an attacker can replace them with a new block
with different content Dec0 and compute the new residual block Res0 such that
Res0 = Dec0   Pred, where Pred is the original prediction block. The attacker
then performs forward transform and quantization to obtain a new set of transform
coefficients, replacing the original coefficients in the payload.
5.3.3 Complying with Watermark Extraction
Apart from ensuring that the transform-domain attacks do not alter the authenticated
feature, it is also vital to ensure that the tampered data obeys the watermark extrac-
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tion rule. Watermark extraction includes: extract location identification and extrac-
tion based on extraction rules. Although random extraction locations is deemed
vital for security reason [53], it is more important for copyright protection where
the attack objective is to find and destroy the watermark; a successful attack in the
presented approach depends more heavily on complying with the watermark ex-
traction rules. For verification efficiency, existing CBA schemes perform extraction
by evaluating either the LSB or zero/non-zero coefficients as mentioned in subsec-
tion 5.2. Such characteristics can always be engineered in the coefficients or MVs.
Since DPMs can be categorized into sets generating similar prediction blocks [62],
an attacker can select DPMs within the same set to satisfy the even/odd evaluation.
5.4 Attack Examples on Existing CBA Schemes
In this section, transform-domain attack examples that can be applied on each
category of CBA schemes as discussed in Section 5.3 are demonstrated. More
specifically, this section presents content removal and content modification attacks
on payload-protected schemes, and content insertion attack on header-protected
schemes. The attacks are implemented using the JM reference software [39], where
the attacker’s interception and replacement of macroblock codestream are emulated
by modifying the decoder’s ‘read’ data. The video sequences used in the attacks
are the 352  288 News, Bridge and Waterfall sequences [3] and a 384  288
surveillance sequence [85], all encoded in IBBBBBBBP format with QP = 28
for intra frames and QP = 30 for inter frames. The source files can be viewed at
https://sites.google.com/site/smusvc/Authentication.
5.4.1 Content Removal Attacks
A content removal attack is the act of replacing an object with its background infor-
mation.
Figures 5.5(a)-5.5(e) show the first five frames of the original News sequence,
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Figure 5.5: Content removal attack on News sequence, with the original frames
shown in (a)-(e) and attack frames in (f)-(j).
where Figure 5.5(a) is an intra frame and Figure 5.5(b)-5.5(e) are inter frames. The
aim of the attack is to remove content of the targeted blocks, i.e., the ballerina, by
finding new attack prediction blocks such that the end result is a set of attacked
blocks that convey the background information, i.e., the walls. Notice that in Fig-
ure 5.5(a), the targeted blocks are surrounded by reference blocks conveying similar
content, i.e., the walls. This is an example where the attack prediction blocks are the
original prediction blocks and it implies that the samples in the (targeted) residual
blocks have high magnitude since they do not have similar prediction blocks to be
used for compression (see Equation 5.1). Hence, the workaround by manipulating
QP of the targeted blocks to suppress their residual samples is executed. Subse-
quently, if necessary, the DPMs of the targeted blocks (e.g., torso of the ballerina)
are modified to use background blocks as attack prediction blocks.
Since intra frames are used as (one of the) reference frame(s) to generate predic-
tion blocks for the subsequent inter frames, the content of the attacked intra frame
will “propagate” to the inter frames during decoding. The residuals of the original
content in inter frames were completely removed by modifying the MV of targeted
blocks in the inter frames. The final result of the removal attack is shown in Figure
5.5(f)-5.5(j).
Due to differential coding of prediction mode parameters, there is a risk of er-
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(a) Distorted frame (b) Corrected frame
Figure 5.6: Visual distortion due to DPM decoding error and its correction.
ror propagation after one is manipulated. Figure 5.6(a) shows an example of error
propagation due to erroneous DPM decoding in an intra frame, which is resolved by
correcting the DPM of the affected block(s) to use a more suitable prediction block
for decoding. The result of this correction is shown in Figure 5.6(b).
There are also cases where QP manipulation is not needed. Figure 5.7(a) shows
the first frame of the Bridge sequence. In this example, it is sufficient to modify
the DPMs of targeted blocks, i.e., the left pier, to use the background information,
i.e., the river, as attack prediction blocks. The result of the removal attack is shown
in Figure 5.7(b). In this case, QP manipulation is not needed because the origi-
nal prediction blocks are obtained from the top of the targeted blocks and they are
semantically similar, thus, the residual blocks have samples of small magnitude.
Replacing the original prediction blocks with the attack prediction blocks on the
left (i.e., the river) replaces the content of the targeted blocks with the content of the
attack prediction blocks.
5.4.2 Content Modification Attacks
In this subsection, two examples of content modification attacks on payload-
protected schemes that includes content replacement and content relocation attacks
are shown.
Content replacement is the act of replacing (or “overwriting”) the content of a
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(a) Original frame (b) Attacked frame
Figure 5.7: Content removal attack on Bridge sequence.
(a) Original frame (b) Attacked frame
Figure 5.8: Content replacement attack on Waterfall sequence..
targeted block with that of its desired attack block. In the first example, content
replacement attack is mounted on the intra frame of the Waterfall sequence. As
shown in Figure 5.8, the DPMs of a large set of targeted blocks are modified to
“extend” the effect of attack prediction blocks, i.e., the trees, such that they cover
the original blocks, i.e., the waterfall.
In the second example, the reference frame index is modified to achieve content
replacement in inter frames. In addition, the partition size parameter is also mod-
ified to facilitate the attack. Figure 5.9(b) shows the timing information extracted
from a surveillance frame in Figure 5.9(a). This timing information is encoded us-
ing 1616 macroblocks, where the upper half of each macroblock covers the tim-
ing information (targeted) while the lower half covers the surveillance background
(non-targeted). Tampering with the reference frame index will affect both the timing
information and the surveillance background. By manipulating the partition size pa-
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(a) Original frame (b) Original timing (c) Attacked timing
Figure 5.9: Content replacement attack on a surveillance sequence.
rameter such that each targeted 16 16 macroblock is partitioned into sixteen 4 4
blocks, the targeted content is isolated from the non-targeted content. The reference
frame index of the targeted blocks can then be modified independently without af-
fecting the non-targeted blocks. Figure 5.9(c) shows the result of this attack; when
the attacked frames are inserted into the video sequence, a scrambled timing infor-
mation is observed.
Content relocation is the act of changing the position of an object from one loca-
tion to another. This attack is typically difficult to achieve on intra frames because
each intra block is predicted from its neighbouring blocks; to perform a meaningful
content relocation that is affected by, and will be affecting, neighbouring blocks is
intuitively hard. For an inter block, however, this attack can be achieved by mod-
ifying the MV using a concept similar to content removal. Figure 5.10(a) shows
a frame extracted from the surveillance sequence. In this attack, the MVs of the
targeted blocks, i.e., the dustbin, are modified such that they use a new content, i.e.,
the man, as attack prediction blocks. Subsequently, the blocks containing the man
is removed using the content removal attack methodology presented in the previous
subsection. The result of this attack is shown in Figure 5.10(b).
5.4.3 Content Insertion Attacks
For completeness, an example of content insertion attack on header-protected
schemes is shown since this attack is not possible on payload-protected schemes.
Figure 5.11 shows an example of content insertion attack on header-protected CBA
74
(a) Original frame (b) Attacked frame
Figure 5.10: Content relocation attack on a surveillance sequence.
Figure 5.11: Content insertion attack on header-protected CBA schemes.
schemes, where the original frame is shown in Figure 5.9(a). Taking the samples of
arbitrary image of a clock, the residual blocks are obtained by subtracting the orig-
inal prediction blocks from the samples. The residual blocks are then transformed
and quantized, and inserted into the macroblock payload.
5.4.4 Summary and Remarks
In summary, in contrary to images, videos’ transform-domain header parameters
and payload must be simultaneously integrity protected since their interdependency
relationship can be exploited to mount semantic-changing attacks in the transform
domain. For attacks on payload-protected schemes, DPM, MV and reference frame
index affect the generation of prediction block, which when combined with the
(untampered) residual block, could semantically change the targeted block. While
DPM selects prediction blocks from neighbouring blocks, MV and reference frame
index select them from a wider search range. An advanced attacker may modify the
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macroblock type (intra/inter) and remove or insert bogus prediction mode relevant
to the newmacroblock type; attacks of such nature are left as future work. Addition-
ally, the QP is a header parameter that can be used as a workaround to inexplicitly
modify the residual block while the partition size can be modified to facilitate search
for a suitable prediction block. For attacks on header-protected schemes, it is vital
that the distribution of tampered coefficients tallies with the coded block pattern
(CBP) in the header, otherwise a decoding error may occur. It is acknowledged that
authenticating the CBP in the header will impose a higher level of difficulty on the
attacks, however, in existing header-protected schemes, this parameter is often left
unprotected. In the literature, there are also CBA schemes that authenticate both the
payload and the MVs in the header [45][76][100]. However, as shown in the attack
examples, these schemes are still vulnerable to attacks such as DPM attacks on intra
blocks, reference frame index and/or partition size attacks on inter blocks.
For H.264/SVC, i.e., the scalable extension of H.264/AVC that is used to en-
code the sequences used in this study, a mandatory base layer (BL) that is backward
compatible with AVC is encoded. Using BL as reference to generate prediction, one
or more enhancement layers (ELs) that gradually improve the resolution or quality
of the video are encoded. If header-protected CBA schemes are applied on an SVC
codestream, attacks on the payload of BL and ELs are possible (and powerful). On
the other hand, if coefficients-protected CBA schemes are applied, the attacks pre-
sented in the previous section are applicable to the BL and the effect could propagate
to the ELs. Thus, noting the importance of the BL, the work of [89] cryptographi-
cally protects the BL to prevent any form of malicious tampering1. Although there
are minimal header parameters in the ELs [75], there are still several important pa-
rameters, e.g., the motion prediction flag and residual prediction flag. For the ELs,
a motion prediction flag of ‘1’ indicates that the EL directly uses header parame-
ters of its reference (base) layer; otherwise, it carries its own header parameters. A
1Pixel-domain CBA scheme is used in [89] to protect the ELs and thus is out of the scope of
study for this study.
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residual prediction flag of ‘1’, on the other hand, indicates that the EL’s payload
R0EL is obtained by subtracting the upsampled BL payload RBL from the payload
obtained via AVC-like encoding REL; otherwise, R0EL = REL. An advanced attacker
could then opt to modify these flags and to manipulate the video semantic. In short,
content-based authentication for SVC present several interesting research problems
to be explored.
5.5 Analysis on the Attacks on Payload-Protected
Schemes
Semantic-changing attacks on videos authenticated by payload- or header-protected
CBA schemes are possible by modifying, respectively, the header or the payload of
the targeted block(s); moreover, these attacks cannot be detected by the respective
CBA schemes.
Since the attacks on header-protected schemes are relatively straightforward,
the following discussions focus on the attacks on payload-protected schemes. As
shown in Section 5.4, a targeted block will convey a semantically different content
as compared to its original content if a suitable attack prediction block is found
from the searchable region. In this section, the ways for an attacker to obtain the
suitable attack prediction block - given the attacker’s desired attack block and the
unmodifiable residual block - is analyzed. The analysis is performed on a 44-
block level, where a macroblockM is represented as follow:
M =
M(B0) M(B1) M(B4) M(B5)
M(B2) M(B3) M(B6) M(B7)
M(B8) M(B9) M(B12) M(B13)
M(B10) M(B11) M(B14) M(B15)
where M(Bi) denotes the i-th (44)-block of M, and can be represented by a 44
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Table 5.1: List of notations
Notations Descriptions
Dec, Res, Pred Original decoded, residual and prediction macroblock,
respectively, each containing 16 44-blocks
Dec(B), Res(B),
Pred(B)
Original decoded, residual and prediction 44-block,
respectively
d(B), p(B) Average of the samples in Dec(B) and Pred(B), respec-
tively
r^(B) Median of residual samples in Res(B)
Dec0(B), Res0(B),
Pred0(B)
An attack decoded, residual and prediction 44- block,
respectively
d0(B), r^0(B), p0(B) Average of the samples in Dec0(B), Res0(B), Pred0(B),
respectively
E(Res) =
P3
i;j=0
ri;j
16
Energy of the residual samples in Res(B), where ri;j is
the residual sample at position (i; j) in Res(B)
, 	 Pixel-/Sample-wise addition and subtraction, respec-
tively
matrix. Using the same convention, an original and prediction macroblock (denoted
Dec and Pred respectively), are made up of Dec(Bi) and Pred(Bi) for i = 0;    ; 15.
The list of notations is shown in Table 5.1.
Generally, the average value of a 44-block is a good approximation of the
block’s samples [51][57][98] due to the high correlation between samples in the
block. Since the residual block may consist of positive and negative integers, the
median of the residual samples is used to indicate the relationship between the orig-
inal block and the original prediction block. In other words, if r^(B) > 0, then
Dec(B) is perceptually brighter than Pred(B); otherwise, Dec(B) is perceptually
darker than Pred(B). In addition, let E(Res) be the energy of the residual samples
in Res(B) as defined in Table 5.1.
Given an original (targeted) block Dec(B) with d(B) and the residual block
Res(B) having a median r^(B), the conditions on the desired attack blockDec0(B) (in
terms of d0(B)) such that the attacker can find an attack prediction block Pred0(B),
where Dec0(B) = Pred0(B)  Res(B) is discussed. The following analysis can be
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applied to the attacks on both intra and inter blocks.
Case 1A. When most of the residual samples are positive, i.e., r^(B) > 0, it implies
that the original (targeted) block Dec(B) is perceptually brighter than the original
prediction block Pred(B), i.e., d(B) > p(B). If the desired attack block Dec0(B) is
to be perceptually brighter than Dec(B), then an attacker finds an attack prediction
block Pred0(B) if and only if d0(B)  d(B) + 2r^(B).
To prove this, suppose d(B) < d0(B) < d(B) + 2r^(B). Substituting Equation
5.2:
p(B) + r^(B) < p0(B) + r^(B) < p(B) + r^(B) + 2r^(B)
p(B) < p0(B) < p(B) + 2r^(B) (5.3)
Referring to Equation 5.3, an attack prediction block Pred0(B)with p0(B) cannot
be found. Otherwise, by computing Res0(B) = Dec(B) 	 Pred0(B), the upper and
lower bound of r^0(B) is:
r^0(B)UB = d(B)  p(B) = r^(B), and (5.4)
r^0(B)LB = d(B)  (p(B) + 2r^(B)) =  r^(B) (5.5)
In other words, r^(B) < r^0(B) < r^(B). This implies that compared to the origi-
nal prediction block Pred(B), the attack prediction block Pred0(B) generates smaller
residual samples if it is used to encode Dec(B). This contradicts the video coding
rule, where Pred(B) is initially chosen to encode Dec(B) because it generates the
smallest Sum of Absolute Errors, SAE=
P3
i;j=0 jdi;j pi;jj, where di;j is the sample
of Dec(B) at position (i; j) and pi;j is the sample of Pred(B) at position (i; j), com-
pared to all other candidate prediction blocks in the searchable region [71]. This
case can be demonstrated in the attack shown in Figure 5.7(b). If Pred0(B) cannot
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be found, the workaround by manipulating QP can be implemented to suppress the
residual samples so that the available candidate prediction blocks can be used to
obtain Dec0(B).
Case 1B. When most of the residual samples are positive, i.e., r^(B) > 0, but the
desired attack block Dec0(B) is to be perceptually darker than the original block
Dec(B), then the minimum value for a sample d0i;j in Dec
0(B) must be equal to the
residual sample ri;j in Res(B). This is because the minimum sample for Dec0(B)
is when Pred0(B) = 0 (see Equation 5.2), otherwise, if d0(B) < r^(B), then by
substituting Equation 5.2, p0(B) + r^(B) < r^(B) and the samples in the attack
prediction block is less than zero, which is not feasible. Thus, in approximation,
r^(B)  d0(B) < d(B). This condition is demonstrated in the attack shown in Figure
5.5, where the background information (the walls) is perceptually darker than the
targeted blocks (the ballerina), but the residuals samples are too large for Dec0(B)
to satisfy this condition. The QP can then be manipulated to suppress/magnify the
residual samples as deemed necessary.
Case 2A. When most of the residual samples are negative, i.e., r^(B) < 0, the
original block Dec(B) is perceptually darker than the original prediction block
Pred(B). Suppose the desired attack block Dec0(B) is to be perceptually brighter
than Dec(B), then a sample d0i;j in Dec
0(B) is upper bounded by 255   jri;jj in
Res(B) as dictated by Equation 5.2. Thus, it can be written in approximation that
d(B) < d0(B)  255  jr^(B)j. A similar analysis to Case 1B can be applied, where
if d0(B) > 255   jr^(B)j, then the attacker must find an attack prediction block
Pred0(B) where p0(B) > 255, which is not possible. This condition can be observed
in the attack shown in Figure 5.8(b).
Case 2B. When most of the residual samples are negative, i.e., r^(B) < 0, but the
desired attack block Dec0(B) is to be perceptually darker than the original block
Dec(B), then an attacker finds an attack prediction block Pred0(B) if and only if
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Table 5.2: Summary of Cases 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B.
r^(B) > 0 r^(B) < 0
Dec0(B) is perceptually
brighter than Dec(B)
Case 1A
d0(B)  d(B)  2r^(B)
Case 2A
d(B) < d0(B)  255  jr^(B)j
Dec0(B) is perceptually
darker than Dec(B)
Case 1B
r^(B)  d0(B) < d(B)
Case 2B
d0(B)  d(B)   2jr^(B)j
d0(B)  d(B)   2jr^(B)j. This condition can be obtained by a similar prove by
contradiction as in Case 1A, whereas an illustration example is shown in the upper
torso, especially the head of the ballerina in Figure 5.5(f).
Table 5.2 summarizes the conditions for the above cases. When the attack block
Dec0(B) cannot satisfy the conditions in any of the cases above, then the attacker
cannot find an attack prediction block Pred0(B) such that Dec0(B) = Pred0(B) 
Res(B). A workaround can then be performed by modifying the unprotected QP
to suppress or magnify the residual samples depending on the available candidate
attack prediction blocks.
5.6 Discussion
Existing content-based authentication (CBA) schemes designed for non-scalable
video codestreams are insecure due to insufficient feature extraction. The over-
looked interdependent relationship between the header and payload parameters can
be exploited to perform semantic-changing attacks in the transform domain. In this
chapter, several semantic-changing attack examples that are performed in the trans-
form domain are presented and these attacks cannot be detected by the schemes.
This is followed by a discussion focusing on the conditions at which an attack on
payload-protected CBA schemes can succeed given a desired attack content and the
unmodifiable payload, and if not, a workaround for it.
A possible countermeasure to these attacks is to use more complicated water-
mark extraction rules. However, unlike images, real-time extraction is vital for
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video authentication [66] which makes straight-forward watermark extraction rules
such as those surveyed in this chapter highly preferred. Another possible coun-
termeasure is to extract and authenticate features from both the header and pay-
load domains. In practical applications, transcoding requires full decoding of in-
tra frames and partial decoding of inter frames. The transcoding of intra frames
drastically changes the header and payload [42], and to the best of the author’s
knowledge, there is no work that addresses this problem. Transcoding inter frames
changes the payload while the remaining data in the header remains unchanged. Al-
though existing payload-domain schemes are able to extract a stable feature from
the coefficients, but sparsely-distributed coefficients in inter frames (especially after
transcoding) are commonly overlooked, thereby leaving them vulnerable to tamper-
ing. Thus far, a stable feature from the header of intra frames is observed. The
future research is to design a secure and efficient authentication scheme that over-
comes the vulnerability of existing schemes and is robust against bit-rate transcod-
ing (performed by semi-trusted intermediary proxies) as described above.
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Chapter 6
Access Control for Scalable
Multimedia Codestreams
6.1 Introduction
Cryptographic-based access control manages authorization to protected data by en-
crypting them such that only authorized users with the right access keys can decrypt
the data. Access control is an important problem in multimedia applications such as
IPTV and video-on-demand, where a multimedia source publishes different privi-
lege levels, each granting its subscribers the access right to codestreams of different
temporal, spatial and/or quality scalability. In multimedia coding standards such
as H.264/SVC, a video is encoded into a multi-layered codestream, where decod-
ing more enhancement layers in a specific scalability (along with the mandatory
base layer) produces a multimedia presentation of higher quality in that dimension.
Hence, scalable codestreams such as the H.264/SVC provides a readily available
structure for a source to provide “subscription packages” with different privilege
levels, where the higher privilege level a user subscribes to, the more enhancement
layers the user is entitled to have access to.
An access control scheme designed for H.264/SVC codestreams should em-
ploy an access keys generation hierarchy that is compatible with the codestream
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structure. The access keys generation hierarchy should also be efficient such that
the source and users of different privilege levels need to maintain/obtain minimum
number of access keys in order to decrypt the codestreams. In addition, the ac-
cess keys generation process should be secure against collusion attack, where two
or more users having access keys to codestreams of lower privilege levels collude
to obtain access key to codestreams of a higher privilege level. In an access con-
trol framework, online key distribution center (KDC) is commonly employed to
distribute access keys to authorized users. This poses a scalability problem when
the number of users increases and improper management of online KDC could also
result in a single point of failure, thus, it is desirable to eliminate the need for an
online KDC.
There are only a handful of access control schemes for scalable multimedia
codestreams. The work of [106] designed an access control scheme for MPEG-4
FGS (Fine Grain Scalability) codestreams. It uses independent access key to en-
crypt different enhancement layers. As a result, each user needs to maintain one
access key for each layer in the privilege level that he/she subscribes to. To over-
come this limitation, [105] proposes to use the Diffie-Hellman technique to generate
access keys for all lower layers so that a user needs to only maintain a single ac-
cess key regardless of privilege level he/she subscribes to. However, the scheme is
vulnerable to collusion attacks as will be shown in Section 6.3. The work of [93]
proposes an access control scheme for H.264/SVC codestreams, where a user needs
to only maintain a single access key, but the scheme is also vulnerable to collusion
attack. In addition, these schemes assume the use of an online KDC for access keys
distribution.
In this chapter, an access control scheme for generic scalable codestream
and H.264/SVC scalable multimedia codestreams, respectively, is proposed. The
schemes use efficient access keys generation hierarchies that are secure against col-
lusion attack, and require the user to maintain only a single access key regardless
of the privilege level that a user subscribes to. The schemes eliminate the use of
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an online KDC by using ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) to
encrypt the access keys.
6.1.1 Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
The building block used in this chapter is the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based En-
cryption scheme (CP-ABE) proposed in [7]. In CP-ABE, every user’s secret key is
associated with a set of attributes while every ciphertext is associated with a cipher-
text policy, i.e. an access structure on attributes. A user successfully deciphers a
ciphertext on the condition that the user’s key attributes satisfy the access structure
specified in the ciphertext.
Specifically, an access structure is represented by an access tree TR with a root
denoted by R and n leaf nodes corresponding to n attributes respectively. Each
inner node x with cx children nodes is attached with a threshold value tx satisfying
0 < tx  cx. For all leaf nodes x, tx = 1. Given a set of attributesA, T is evaluated
from the leaves upward to R. A leaf is evaluated as 1, i.e. True, if and only if the
corresponding attribute is enclosed inA. Each inner node x is then evaluated as 1 if
and only if at least tx of its children nodes are evaluated as 1. If R is evaluated as 1,
then TR(A) = 1, namely, A matches access structure TR. An example access tree
is depicted in Figure 6.1.
1
2a1 a2
a
3
a
4
Figure 6.1: An access tree for the access structure a1 _ a2 _ (a3 ^ a4), where
a1; a2; a3; a4 are four attributes.
The CP-ABE scheme in [7] consists of the following four algorithms:
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AB-Setup is an initialization algorithm run by a trusted authority. It takes as input
a security parameter, outputs a public key PK and a master secret keyMK.
AB-KeyGen(MK;A) is run by the authority to issue a key for a given attribute set
A. It takes as inputMK and A, outputs a key SKA associated with A.
AB-Encrypt(PK;m; T ) is run by a user to perform a CP-ABE encryption on mes-
sagem with an access structure T . Taking as input PK,m and T , it outputs
a ciphertext CTT .
AB-Decrypt(CTT ; T ; SKA;A) is run by a user holding SKA to decrypt a cipher-
text CTT with a ciphertext policy T . If T (A) = 1, it outputs the correspond-
ing plaintextm correctly. Otherwise, it outputs ?.
6.2 Access Control and Authentication for Generic
Scalable Codestreams
As before, a source-proxy-user content distribution framework is considered and a
scalable multimedia codestream with a set of layers fL0; L1;    ; Lmg, where L0 is
the base layer while L1;    ; Lm correspond to m enhancement layers is modeled.
When joining the system, a user subscribes to a privilege level based on her pref-
erence. In general, the number of privilege levels is less than the number of layers.
However, to simplify the presentation and without loss of generality, it is assumed
that they are the same and that a user with privilege level j is entitled to access the
set of layers fLigji=0, j = 0; 1;    ;m.
The proposed scheme is constructed upon an authentication scheme in Chapter
3. To enforce access control on a codestream, the source picks a random root key km
and then computes km 1 = H(km); km 2 = H(km 1);    ; k0 = H(k1); kMAC =
H(k0), where H(:) is a one-way hash function. The source uses kMAC to authen-
ticate the codestream as in the HMAC-based authentication scheme and uses ki to
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encrypt layer Li, i = 0; 1;    ;m.
The CP-ABE scheme in subsection 6.1.1 is used to encrypt the encryption/ac-
cess keys such that only privileged users can obtain the corresponding keys. For
each kj , j = 0; 1;    ;m, the source constructs a CP-ABE access tree  j which has
a single attribute node aj corresponding to privilege level j with a threshold value
1. That is,  j(fajg) = 1. The source computes the CP-ABE encryption on kj with
the single-node access structure  j . Due to the simplicity of  j , the resulting ci-
phertext has the minimum length. A user u subscribing to privilege level j holds the
CP-ABE secret key SKuj associated with the attribute aj and recovers kj from the
corresponding ciphertext. Then, starting from kj , the user traverses the hash chain
to get all the keys for decrypting the layers she is allowed to access.
The proposed access control and authentication scheme consists of four algo-
rithms - Initialization which initializes the source and users’ settings, KeyDistri-
bution which distributes the symmetric encryption keys to users, StreamGenera-
tion which encrypts and authenticates a multimedia codestream, and StreamReceive
which decrypts and verifies a received codestream.
Initialization: The source runs AB-Setup to generate a CP-ABE PK andMK.
When a user u registers to the source and subscribes to privilege level j, the source
returns to her a (SKuj ;Aj) tuple, where the attribute set Aj = fajg and SKuj =
AB-KeyGen(MK;Aj).
KeyDistribution: The source executes the following steps to generate and dis-
tribute symmetric keys to all users.
Step K1. Choose a random symmetric key km and generate
km 1; km 2;    ; k0; kMAC as described above.
Step K2. For each j 2 [0;m], construct an access structure  j as specified above,
and encrypt kj to get CTj = AB-Encrypt(PK; kj; j).
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Step K3. Send the set of ciphertexts fCTj; jgmj=0 to the users over either an in-
band or out-of-band channel.
StreamGeneration: As the HMAC-based authentication scheme, the scheme
here operates at the individual packet level. Given a packet P = L0k    kLm in a
multimedia codestream, the source performs the following steps.
Step A1. Generate an authenticated packet P 0 = L00k    kL0m by running the Au-
thentication algorithm of an authentication scheme specified in Chapter 3 with
the key kMAC .
Step A2. Generate an encrypted and authenticated packet P 00 = L000k    kL00m by
computing L00i = Enc(L
0
i; ki), for all 0  i  m, where Enc() is a sym-
metric encryption algorithm in a standard mode of operation, such as CBC or
Counter mode [40].
Step A3. Output P 00 as an authenticated and encrypted version of P .
StreamReceive: A user subscribing to privilege level j receives her granted keys
during the key distribution phase. Specifically, when a user u with (SKuj ;Aj) re-
ceives fCTi; igmi=0, she computes kj = AB-Decrypt(CTj; j; SKuj ;Aj). Then,
she traverses the hash chain to derive all the keys, kj 1;    ; k0; kMAC , granted to
her.
Upon receiving an encrypted and authenticated packet P 00 = L000k    kL00m t
from a proxy, the user proceeds as follows.
Step V1. Decrypt L00i to obtain L0i = Dec(L00i ; ki), for i = j; j   1;    ; 1; 0.
Step V2. For each decrypted layer L0j , execute the Verification algorithm in Sec-
tion 3.3 using kMAC as the verification key.
Note that incorporation of authentication in the encryption based access control
scheme is not optional. It is well known that standard operation modes of block ci-
phers do not provide message authentication [40] and that using encryption without
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adequate integrity protection is vulnerable to active attacks [43]. It is believed that
integrity or authentication service must be offered in any security-aware transmis-
sion [41].
6.3 Access Control and Authentication for
H.264/SVC Codestreams
In this section, the generic scheme presented in Section 6.2 is extended and applied
to protect H.264/SVC codestreams. The description will focus on access control
while omitting the part on codestream authentication. In addition, let y consecutive
applications of the one-way functionH(:) be denoted asHy(x) = Hy 1(H(x)).
In [93], an access control scheme is proposed for H.264/SVC-encoded video
codestreams having temporal, spatial and quality scalabilities. A video codestream
is modelled in two dimensions - the vertical dimension for spatial-quality layers of
a frame and the horizontal dimension for different frames (i.e. temporal layers). In
both dimensions, the higher layer depends on the lower layers for decoding. Let the
term “unit”, denoted as Di;j , refer to spatial-quality layer i of a frame belonging to
temporal layer j. Thus, a codestream with S spatial-quality layers and T temporal
layers can have up to S  T units. The requirement of an access control scheme is
such that for a user having access privilege to the unit Ds;t, the user will also have
access to the set of units fDi;j j i 2 [0; s   1]; j 2 [0; t   1]g, but not the units
higher than Ds;t (see Figure 6.2).
For the sake of consistency, the scheme in [93] is illustrated in terms of the
algorithms in Section 6.2 - namely KeyDistribution, StreamGeneration and Stream-
Receive.
KeyDistribution: Given an H.264 codestream as shown in Figure 6.2, the source
chooses a random K, computes kY = H(Kk1) and kX = H(Kk2), where kY and
kX denote the scalability type keys for the spatial-quality scalability and temporal
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Figure 6.2: H.264/SVC-encoded codestream as modelled in [93] with S = 4
spatial-quality layers and T = 3 temporal layers. Direction of an arrow indicates
a unit of the lower privilege, i.e. a privilege to access unit D1;2 will also allow the
user to access the units D1;1; D1;0; D0;2; D0;1; and D0;0.
scalability, respectively. Then, the source computes, for all layers i = S   1; S  
2;    ; 0 in the spatial-quality scalability, the set of keys fkY;ig as kY;i = HS i(kY ).
Similarly, the source computes, for all layers j = T 1; T 2;    ; 0 in the temporal
scalability, the set of keys kX;j = HT i(kX). It then forwards the keys securely to
a KDC.
StreamGeneration: For every unit in spatial-quality layer i and temporal layer
j, i.e. Di;j , the source uses k(i; j) = kY;ikkX;j as the symmetric key to encrypt Di;j
and then send the encrypted codestream to the users.
StreamReceive: A user with access privilege to the unit Ds;t first authenticates
herself to the KDC to obtain the key k(s; t) = kY;skkX;t. Using k(s; t), the user
derives all k(p; q) for p < s and q < t and uses this set of keys to decrypt the units
she is entitled to access.
The scheme in [93] allows both the KDC and a user to maintain only a single
key, and a privileged user can derive all the necessary keys to decrypt the granted
units using a one-way hash. However, the scheme is subject to collusion attack
where two users separately subscribing to lower privilege levels can cooperate and
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derive access key of a higher privilege level. With reference to Figure 6.2, sup-
pose a user obtains k(0; 2) = kY;0kkX;2 from the KDC and another user obtains
k(3; 0) = kY;3kkX;0. When they collude, they obtain k(3; 2) = kY;3kkX;2 for de-
crypting the full codestream that they originally did not have privileges to access.
This workaround is clearly unacceptable for most applications.
The following subsections show two approaches that are secure against this type
of user collusion attack. In both approaches, the source classifies the layers into
privilege levels. Note that a privilege level may cover one or more layers. However,
to simplify explanation, it is assumed that each unit Di;j corresponds to a privilege
level (i; j). As a result, there are S  T privilege levels: (i; j); i 2 [0; S   1]; j 2
[0; T   1]. The source generates S  T access keys ki;j to encrypt Di;j , i 2 [0; S  
1]; j 2 [0; T   1], uses CP-ABE to encrypt ki;j , and then sends the ciphertexts to
users over either in-band or out-of-band channels. The two approaches differ in how
the keys ki;j are generated.
6.3.1 Access Keys Generation - Approach 1
To generate a set of S  T access keys, the source
1. Generates a random keyK.
2. For the highest temporal layer T   1 in every spatial-quality layer i; i 2
[0; S  1], computes ki;T 1 = HS i(Kk\S 00) where \S 00 is the ASCII code of
the letter S.
3. In a given spatial-quality layer s; s 2 [0; S   1], for each of the remaining
temporal layers j; j 2 [0; T   2], computes ks;j = HT 1 j(ks;T 1k\T 00)
where \T 00 is the ASCII code of the letter T.
Figure 6.3 shows the keys generated for the codestream in Figure 6.2. Depend-
ing on a user’s access requirements, there are two scenarios to be considered at the
user end (see Figure 6.3).
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Figure 6.3: Access keys generated using Approach 1. If a user subscribes to priv-
ilege level (2; 2), she needs to know the key k2;2 to access the lower privilege
levels; if the user subscribes to privilege level (2; 1), she needs to know the keys
k2;1; k1;1; k0;1 in order to access the lower privilege levels.
1. User subscribes to privilege level (s; T   1) (i. e., to a codestream with cer-
tain spatial-quality layer s but with the highest temporal layer T   1). The
user only needs to obtain ks;T 1 from the corresponding CP-ABE ciphertext.
Using ks;T 1, she can derive the set of keys fki;jg for i 2 [0; s   1] and
j 2 [0; T   2].
2. User subscribes to privilege level (s; t) for some spatial-quality layer s and
some temporal layer t. The user needs to first obtain fki;tgi2[0;s] by decrypting
s + 1 CP-ABE ciphertexts and then computes the other keys necessary for
decrypting the units she is entitled to access.
This approach allows the source to maintain a single key but a user has to main-
tain potentially more than one keys due to the sequential key generation. The ef-
ficiency of this approach is the highest if a user subscribes to a codestream of the
highest temporal layer (regardless of which spatial-quality layer) since she needs to
perform only one CP-ABE decryption. On the other hand, if the user subscribes to
a temporal layer other than the highest layer, she needs to perform more than one
CP-ABE decryptions - the maximum being the number of available spatial-quality
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Figure 6.4: Keys generated using Approach 2, where x3;1 = k3;1  H(k3;2kl3;1);
y2;2 = k2;2 H(k3;2kl2;2); x2;1 = k2;1 H(k2;2kl2;1); y2;1 = k2;1 H(k3;1kl2;1).
layers in the codestream1.
6.3.2 Access Keys Generation - Approach 2
In the second approach, a key generation method proposed in [4] is utilized. To
generate a set of ST access keys, for each privilege level (i; j), the source chooses
a random secret access key ki;j , a unique public label li;j and where applicable,
public values yi 1;j = ki 1;j  H(ki;jkli 1;j) and xi;j 1 = ki;j 1  H(ki;jkli;j 1)
where  is an exclusive OR operation.2
Figure 6.4 shows the keys generated for the codestream in Figure 6.2. It is
stressed that the secret keys ki;j are CP-ABE encrypted. The CP-ABE ciphertexts
and the public values (i.e., li;j , yi 1;j and xi;j 1) are sent to users via either an in-
band or out-of-band channel.
Note that a user subscribing to a privilege level (s; t) can always derive keys
for the lower privilege levels using the public information and the single key ks;t
as follows. The user first computes ks 1;t = ys 1;t  H(ks;tkls 1;t) and ks;t 1 =
xs;t 1H(ks;tkls;t 1), and then computes all ki;j for i 2 [0; s 2] and j 2 [0; t 2].
This approach similarly eliminates the need of an online KDC, and requires the
source and users to maintain only a single key. As a result, it allows each user
1Note that the source can always alter the key generation sequence depending on user request
pattern to achieve the optimal efficiency.
2jki;j j = jli;j j = jyi;j j = jxi;j j = jH(:)j:
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to perform the minimum number of one CP-ABE decryption. It is secure against
collusion attack due to the one-way function H(:) and it allows users of higher
privilege to efficiently derive access keys for the lower privileges but not vice versa.
However, the public values li;j , yi 1;j and xi;j 1 must be delivered to users which
results in higher communication overhead than Approach 1.
6.4 Remarks and Discussions
The access control schemes in [106] and [105] are designed for the MPEG-4 FGS
codestreams and involve an online KDC. As mentioned, the scheme in [106] gen-
erates independent keys for different privilege levels. As a result, both the KDC
and users have to maintain a large number of keys for every video codestream. This
number is then reduced to one per video codestream in [105] but this scheme is
vulnerable to the same user collusion attack as described in Section 6.3. Note that
the MPEG-4 FGS and the H.264/SVC codestream structures are similar. Hence, the
proposed approaches for H.264/SVC codestreams can be readily applied for access
control of MPEG-4 FGS codestreams as well without the need for an online KDC
and without suffering from the user collusion attack.
Users may subscribe and unsubscribe from a multimedia service. In the case
that a new user subscribes to a multimedia service at a specific privilege level, the
source issues to her a CP-ABE secret key associated with that privilege level. This
is an one time effort and can be done either online or offline. Encrypted multimedia
codestreams can be broadcast to users, and only those users with the secret keys at
the right privilege levels are able to successfully decrypt the received codestreams.
Whenever a user terminates the subscription, the source must “revoke” the user such
that she can no longer access the multimedia service. As pointed out in [7], this can
be achieved by incorporating numerical attributes in a user’s CP-ABE secret key.
For instance, when a user subscribes to a certain privilege level, the source provides
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the user a CP-ABE secret key associated with an attribute specifying an expiry date3.
Before the expiry date, the user will be able to access multimedia codestreams at her
access privilege. Once the time lapses, the user will need to obtain a new CP-ABE
secret key with a new expiry date. Note that for better security, it is prudent practice
to encrypt each video codestream using a different secret key; otherwise compro-
mising one key will result in compromising multiple video codestreams. Without
employing CP-ABE, an online KDC is needed to distribute these secret keys to end
users over authenticated and secure channels. The KDC would be operated by the
source or other parties. In any case, an online KDC leads to higher operating cost
and, if not managed properly, could be a single point of failure.
An access control scheme that allows flexible privilege classifications for
generic scalable multimedia codestreams is proposed. The schemes use CP-ABE
to distribute access keys to users, thereby eliminating the need of an online KDC.
The scheme is also extended for access control of H.264/SVC codestreams. In ad-
dition, a user collusion attack to the existing multimedia codestreams access control
schemes in the literature is pointed out, and two key generation techniques that are
secure against the collusion attack are presented.
3Such application is feasible since most multimedia subscription is on a monthly or yearly basis.
95
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This dissertation makes contributions on the issue of authentication and access
control in online distribution of multimedia codestreams. For authentication, the
cryptographic-based and content-based authentication solutions are studied, respec-
tively, as a mean to authenticate multimedia codestreams in the event of transcoding.
Two cryptographic-based authentication schemes for generic scalable codestreams
arr presented, combining the hash-chaining technique and double error correction
coding algorithm to achieve proxy-transparency and resiliency to packet losses with
a low communication overhead. To reduce computation cost, the second scheme
replaces digital signature with a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC)
and the HMAC-based authentication scheme achieves a packet-level loss-resiliency.
The performance of the schemes are analyzed and it is shown that although the
signature-based scheme has a higher communication overhead compared to existing
schemes, they have similar computation and verification times while the signature-
based scheme possesses the proxy-transparency property. The HMAC-based au-
thentication scheme further outperforms the signature-based scheme in terms of
computation time, verification delay and loss-resiliency.
The signature-based scheme for generic codestreams is further extended to ad-
dress the issue of authentication for H.264/SVC codestreams, where in addition to
spatial-quality layers within a frame, an H.264/SVC codestream is also encoded
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with one or more temporal layers, each containing a subset of frames. By inte-
grating the temporal scalability structure with double error correction coding and
packet replications, the scheme is robust to transcoding and it achieves a high loss-
resiliency with a low communication overhead under burst loss condition. The pro-
posed scheme is further compared and analyzed with an existing scheme in [56]
in terms of its loss-resiliency under different conditions such as the spatial-quality
layer dependency structures and codestream transmission orders.
As content-based authentication solution is commonly used to authenticate non-
scalable codestreams in the event of transcoding, a study on the security of existing
transform-domain content-based authentication schemes is performed. Based upon
the concept of video coding, a common design flaw in the existing schemes, where
the transform-domain feature extracted by these schemes cannot truly represent the
codestream semantic, is pointed out. As a consequent, an attacker is able to manip-
ulate transform-domain parameters to mount semantic-changing attacks that cannot
be detected by the schemes. A discussion on how the flaw can be exploited is pre-
sented and several attack examples are shown. A further analysis on the attacks
that manipulate transform-domain header parameters, and the conditions required
for the attacks to succeed given an attacker’s desired content is presented.
Finally, the issue of access control for H.264/SVC codestreams for applications
such as video-on-demand is addressed. The proposed access control scheme uses
symmetric encryption to encrypt each spatial-quality/temporal layer with a different
access key and uses ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption as a mean to dis-
seminate access keys to authorized users; as a result, the scheme eliminates the need
to deploy an online key distribution center, which could pose a scalability problem
as the number of users increases. Using a secure and efficient access keys gener-
ation hierarchy that is fully compatible with the H.264/SVC codestream structure,
the proposed access control scheme is secure against collusion attack, and is effi-
cient in the sense that a user needs to only maintain a single access key, regardless
of the privilege level he/she subscribes to.
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7.1 Future Directions
One of the future directions is to design a secure content-based authentication
schemes for non-scalable codestreams in the event of transcoding. Non-scalable
codestreams are commonly transcoded by re-encoding the codestream using a new
quantization step size. However, the process of full decoding and re-encoding is
computationally intensive. Different transcoding techniques have then been pro-
posed to speed up the transcoding process without compromising the visual pre-
sentation of transcoded codestreams. More notably, it is shown in [15] that intra-
predicted frames should be transcoded by a full-decode-and-reencode process to
eliminate drift errors in the transcoded codestream, whereas inter-predicted frames
can be transcoded by reusing header parameters and performing motion compensa-
tion in the transform domain. The aim is to design a content-based authentication
scheme that can extract a secure and robust feature that can survive the different
transcoding techniques for intra- and inter-predicted frames.
One of the challenges in designing a content-based authentication scheme for
scalable codestreams is the robustness of the feature. A feature that is extracted
from a low resolution frame is unable to correctly verify the content of a high reso-
lution frame due to the lower entropy, and vice versa. Most existing content-based
solutions require the verifier to downsample a high resolution frame before veri-
fication. The aim is to eliminate this limitation by studying the characteristics of
transform-domain parameters of a scalable codestream, as well as the significance
of signaling parameters for decoding. Thus, by extracting important feature from
the base layer of the codestream and from important transform-domain and signal-
ing parameters from the enhancement layers, the proposed scheme should be secure
against malicious tampering while remain robust to transcoding.
The Multiview Video Coding (MVC) standard [87] is a new standard for video
compression that allows efficient encoding of video sequences captured simulta-
neously from multiple camera angles in a single codestream. MVC codestreams
98
are backward compatible with H.264/AVC, where an H.264/AVC decoder can de-
code MVC codestreams while ignoring the second view codestream. Apart from
its primary usage for 3D display systems, an MVC codestream can be used for
free-viewpoint videos [78], where users can navigate through different viewpoints
of a scene - whether it is commercial (sports scenes and surveillance) or immersive
teleconference applications. The aim is to study the coding structure of an MVC
codestream and design an efficient authentication scheme that is fully compatible
with this structure to achieve one-time authentication while allowing authenticity
verification of different views.
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